Russia and US are not at war.
Your opinion on the matter is hardly relevant, expert or definitive. Regardless, any country that attacks another country for the purpose of overthrowing its government is arguably in a
defacto state of war, whether or not an official declaration has been made by Congress.
And even alleged meddling is hardly an act of war.
If it had been a general attempt simply to sow chaos without any clearly defined goal, perhaps, but this was a coordinated attack with the sole purpose of overthrowing our government and installing a Russian asset into our highest office.
That is unquestionably a treasonous act on Trump's part. Our
constitution clearly defines Treason:
Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort.
The "Or" has been debated throughout the years, but it clearly distinguishes one of two conditions; levying War OR adhering to our enemies, giving them aid and comfort. Thus, it then would hinge on either the defining qualities of "levying" or of "enemies," which some have argued can
only come from an official declaration from Congress, but, technically is
defined as:
(2) the term “enemy” means any country, government, group, or person that has been engaged in hostilities, whether or not lawfully authorized, with the United States;
(3) the term “person” means—
(A) any natural person;
(B) any corporation, partnership, or other legal entity; and
(C) any organization, association, or group...
"Hostilities" then becomes the operative term and certainly a very good argument can be made that a coordinated cyber attack with the sole purpose of overthrowing our government would constitute a hostile act.
In regard to what constitutes "levying war," Chief Justice Marshall had this to say in
Ex Parte Ballman:
To constitute that specific crime for which the prisoners now before the Court have been commuted, war must be actually levied against the United States. However flagitious may be the crime of conspiring to subvert by force the Government of our country, such conspiracy is not treason. To conspire to levy war. and actually to levy war, are distinct offences. The first must be brought into operation by an assemblage of men for a purpose, treasonable in itself, or the fact of levying war cannot have been committed.
...
It is not the intention of the Court to say that no individual can be guilty of this crime who has not appeared in arms against his country. On the contrary, if war be actually levied, that is, if a body of men Be actually assembled for the purpose of effecting by force a treasonable purpose, all those who perform any part, however minute, or however remote from the scene of action, and who are actually leagued in the general conspiracy, are to be considered as traitors. But there must be an actual assembling of men for a treasonable purpose to constitute levying of war.
There was such an "actual assembling of men for a treasonable purpose"--including "effecting by force a treasonable purpose" as the hackers literally had to force their way into our systems--so the two defining qualities of "levying" are met.
Further:
In the case of The United States vs. FRIES, Mr. Justice CHASE said on the trial, and stated the opinion of the Court to be,
"That if a body of people, conspire and meditate an insurrection to resist or oppose the execution of any statute of the United States by force, they are only guilty of a high misdemeanor; but if they proceed to carry such intention into execution by force, that they are guilty of the treason of levying war; and the quantum of the force employed neither lessens or increases the crime -- whether by one hundred or one thousand persons is wholly immaterial;"
...
"and that it is altogether immaterial whether the force used is sufficient to effectuate the object; any force connected with the intention will constitute the crime of levying war."
Marshall again (emphasis mine):
In the case of the United States vs. AARON BURR, Chief-Justice MARSHALL said:
"There is no difficulty in affirming that there must be a war, or the crime of levying it cannot exist; but there would often be considerable difficulty in affirming that a particular act did or did not involve the person committing it in the guilt and in the fact of levying war. If, for example, an army should be actually raised for the avowed purpose of carrying on open war against the United States and subverting their Government, the point must be weighed very deliberately before a Judge would venture to decide that an overt act of levying war had not been committed by a Commissary of purchases who never saw the army, but who, knowing its object, and leaguing himself with the rebels supplied that army with provisions; or by a Recruiting-officer, holding a commission in the rebel service, who, though never in camp, executed the particular duty assigned to him."
That the army of so-called Russian "trolls" had computers for weapons as opposed to any other form of weaponry and that therefore they were engaging in a more modern form of "cyber" warfare is not germane to the fact that an army actually was raised for the avowed purpose of carrying on open war against the US and subverting our government.
So, you need to declare war first
Not necessarily. Plus there is also the fact that
Russia's invasion of the Ukraine was arguably antagonistic toward the US (regardless of how it deliberately skated just under the NATO wire) and our subsequent sanctions indicative of a hostile condition, also short of official "enemy" status, certainly, but evidently escalating toward the eventual attack against us starting circa 2013.
Regardless, it's unlikely anyone will formerly charge Trump with treason as it would not only be difficult, but necessary. There are numerous other equally impeachable offenses with which to charge him.