My New Argument for a Nonphysical Consciousness

[ryan]

The consciousness in Sydney has you experiencing in it, but the consciousness in Perth does not have you experiencing in it. The consciousness in Perth lacks you experiencing.

Ah. You have to think of what "you" really means.

There is one person in sydney and one person in perth. One is acopy of the other. Both believes themself to be A. Both has the memories of A.

What is the problem?

The reality is that you are not experiencing in Perth. If nobody knows that you are not in Perth, it doesn't make it any less true, right?

 

[ryan]

You seem to be implying that if we don't know something, then there is no objective reality.

No, I am saying that IF it is IMPOSSIBLE to know something within the confines of a THOUGHT EXPERIMENT, THEN taking a 'God's eye view' and claiming that the difference YOU KNOW ABOUT AS THE CREATOR but which is NOT AVAILABLE IN THE EXPERIMENT is important to the RESULT is CHEATING.

The objective reality includes time; by including sufficient time to render the physical difference between original and copy real, you destroy the similarity between original and copy, and it becomes trivial to determine which is which.

The thought experiment seeks to narrow reality to a slice of time, rendering the difference between original and copy undetectable; within the confines of this limited thought experiment, there is NO WAY to tell which is which, and so within the confines of this limited thought experiment there is no way to appeal to objective reality.

This seems to be merging with Juma's argument. So my answer to this one is the same as my answer to Juma. The reality is what it is whether anyone knows it, including the original copy.

 

[Juma]

Ah. You have to think of what "you" really means.

There is one person in sydney and one person in perth. One is acopy of the other. Both believes themself to be A. Both has the memories of A.

What is the problem?

The reality is that you are not experiencing in Perth. If nobody knows that you are not in Perth, it doesn't make it any less true, right?

The you that is in perth are experiencing in perth and the you that is in sidney are experiencing in sidney.

 

[bilby]

No, I am saying that IF it is IMPOSSIBLE to know something within the confines of a THOUGHT EXPERIMENT, THEN taking a 'God's eye view' and claiming that the difference YOU KNOW ABOUT AS THE CREATOR but which is NOT AVAILABLE IN THE EXPERIMENT is important to the RESULT is CHEATING.

The objective reality includes time; by including sufficient time to render the physical difference between original and copy real, you destroy the similarity between original and copy, and it becomes trivial to determine which is which.

The thought experiment seeks to narrow reality to a slice of time, rendering the difference between original and copy undetectable; within the confines of this limited thought experiment, there is NO WAY to tell which is which, and so within the confines of this limited thought experiment there is no way to appeal to objective reality.

This seems to be merging with Juma's argument. So my answer to this one is the same as my answer to Juma. The reality is what it is whether anyone knows it, including the original copy.

Of course it is; and from that 'Gods eye view' perspective, the whole problem simply vanishes.

As you said yourself, there is an obvious physical difference between the two copies in the four dimensional view.

You appear to be seeking a problem where none exists.

Two individuals; two consciousnesses. If the two individuals are sufficiently similar then we can infer that they likely have the same thoughts and memories. From the perspective of an outside observer, they may be hard to tell apart. But each one is his own 'I'. As are we all. People do not have direct access to any consciousness other than that arising from their own brain. This is completely consistent with the idea that consciousness is a property of physical brains.

Where, exactly, is the problem with any of this?

 

[DBT]

Where, exactly, is the problem with any of this?

Most probably because it doesn't support certain cherished beliefs about the ultimate nature of consciousness...

 

[bigfield]

Ah. You have to think of what "you" really means.

There is one person in sydney and one person in perth. One is acopy of the other. Both believes themself to be A. Both has the memories of A.

What is the problem?

The reality is that you are not experiencing in Perth.

You are implying that:

1. A person's identity entails a series of contiguous brain states, and

2. The states of the cloned brain are not contiguous with the states of the original brain before the cloning event.

Your position is indistinguishable from the physicalist position that the mind is inseparable from the brain, and creating a new brain, even a clone of a existing brain, also creates a new personal identity.

 

[ryan]

The reality is that you are not experiencing in Perth. If nobody knows that you are not in Perth, it doesn't make it any less true, right?

The you that is in perth are experiencing in perth and the you that is in sidney are experiencing in sidney.

Oh don't try to pull that B.S. You never do this, so I will let it go this time.

There is a specific person only and constantly experiencing in Sydney. That person is simply not experiencing in Perth.

 

[Juma]

The you that is in perth are experiencing in perth and the you that is in sidney are experiencing in sidney.

Oh don't try to pull that B.S. You never do this, so I will let it go this time.

There is a specific person only and constantly experiencing in Sydney. That person is simply not experiencing in Perth.

I am not saying that the person in sidney is experiencing in perth.

There are two persons. One in sidney and one in perth.
Do you agree ?

 

[ryan]

This seems to be merging with Juma's argument. So my answer to this one is the same as my answer to Juma. The reality is what it is whether anyone knows it, including the original copy.

Of course it is; and from that 'Gods eye view' perspective, the whole problem simply vanishes.

No, god is the one who knows the true reality. I am god in this thought experiment, and I am telling you what is. And we know that this is theoretically possible.

As you said yourself, there is an obvious physical difference between the two copies in the four dimensional view.

You appear to be seeking a problem where none exists.

Two individuals; two consciousnesses. If the two individuals are sufficiently similar then we can infer that they likely have the same thoughts and memories. From the perspective of an outside observer, they may be hard to tell apart. But each one is his own 'I'. As are we all. People do not have direct access to any consciousness other than that arising from their own brain. This is completely consistent with the idea that consciousness is a property of physical brains.

Where, exactly, is the problem with any of this?

Since when does the history of something add any information to what it is? How does history add any physical properties to what it is now?

 

[Speakpigeon]

Suppose further that the two clones wouldn't explode. What then?
EB

You don't even need this scenario. The argument is about the composition of each body. The point is that there is a non-physical component. In other words, there is a non-physical difference between the bodies. Where the body is is not suppose to affect the components of the body in this thought experiment.

Some here have been arguing from a metaphysical and hard-core materialist angle that there will always be a physical difference between the clones (or twins), which effectively denies your OP's premise that "You have a perfect twin right down to the molecule". Your premise ipso facto requires the two bodies to remain identical throughout. If not, you don't even have the beginning of an argument. Can't you see that?!

Of course they may be right anyway.
EB

 

[ryan]

Where, exactly, is the problem with any of this?

Most probably because it doesn't support certain cherished beliefs about the ultimate nature of consciousness...

You obviously have not read my post (post #383) in the other thread.

 

[bilby]

Of course it is; and from that 'Gods eye view' perspective, the whole problem simply vanishes.

No, god is the one who knows the true reality. I am god in this thought experiment, and I am telling you what is. And we know that this is theoretically possible.

As you said yourself, there is an obvious physical difference between the two copies in the four dimensional view.

You appear to be seeking a problem where none exists.

Two individuals; two consciousnesses. If the two individuals are sufficiently similar then we can infer that they likely have the same thoughts and memories. From the perspective of an outside observer, they may be hard to tell apart. But each one is his own 'I'. As are we all. People do not have direct access to any consciousness other than that arising from their own brain. This is completely consistent with the idea that consciousness is a property of physical brains.

Where, exactly, is the problem with any of this?

Since when does the history of something add any information to what it is? How does history add any physical properties to what it is now?

It doesn't.

Let's try this again without the preamble that seems to have you confused:

Two individuals; two consciousnesses. If the two individuals are sufficiently similar then we can infer that they likely have the same thoughts and memories. From the perspective of an outside observer, they may be hard to tell apart. But each one is his own 'I'. As are we all. People do not have direct access to any consciousness other than that arising from their own brain. This is completely consistent with the idea that consciousness is a property of physical brains.

No mention here of history. What is the problem?

 

[Speakpigeon]

As I said, for the sake of the argument, suppose we can create two clones, the exact copy of some original, and have them at the exact same spot. Suppose further this doesn't make them explode. Everything looks the same to both but they can't interact with each other. Now, one of them is sentenced to death.

Then what?
EB

What? Suppose the world doesnt work as it does... What then?
Do you realize how silly that question is?

You're making a fool of yourself.

But if go with the question then really what?
I see problem: since 1 has been either it doesnt matter which or there is a way to tell them apart.

Sorry, I don't understand this gibberish.
EB

 

[ryan]

The reality is that you are not experiencing in Perth.

You are implying that:

1. A person's identity entails a series of contiguous brain states, and

2. The states of the cloned brain are not contiguous with the states of the original brain before the cloning event.

Your position is indistinguishable from the physicalist position that the mind is inseparable from the brain, and creating a new brain, even a clone of a existing brain, also creates a new personal identity.

But all physicalists must share a minimum of one thing in common. All physically identical worlds must be exactly the same in any other respect. If you are saying that I am right and so is a physicalist, then you are really saying that the physicalist is wrong.

 

[ryan]

Oh don't try to pull that B.S. You never do this, so I will let it go this time.

There is a specific person only and constantly experiencing in Sydney. That person is simply not experiencing in Perth.

I am not saying that the person in sidney is experiencing in perth.

I don't think you were saying that. I think you were avoiding my post by saying that "you" is a name for either twin.

There are two persons. One in sidney and one in perth.
Do you agree ?

yes

 

[Speakpigeon]

Suppose further that the two clones wouldn't explode. What then?
EB

Suppose pigs could fly. Suppose I had Infinity Dollars.

Derails. Start new threads if you're interested in these topics.

Suppose ryan had the slightest idea what he was talking about.

That's a bit harsh.

The scenarios you describe are by definition totally impossible. You might as well ask what it would it be like if 1 + 1 made 3 or a triangle had 26 sides.

No.

"1 + 1 = 3" may be impossible by definition for example. Same for triangles. But there's no such a thing as the definition of space. Instead, the question is that of the nature of space and that is an empirical matter, and many scientists accept that we still don't really know what is the nature of space. So my scenarios may be possible.

However, possible or not, I'm really asking you to find any obvious contradiction. Shouldn't be too hard I think.
EB

 

[Keith&Co.]

What does 'only a clone' mean in this context?

It has only a limited history.

How does one detect or measure a limited history if both are identical?
The difference remains in your head. It's not a difference between mother and clone.

Everything about the original is the original including the mind. But somehow the two minds are different.

The minds are identical until you kill one of them. THEN you've introduced a difference. A physical one.

Forget one needing to die for now. While alive, don't you agree that you are experiencing where your original body is, and you are not experiencing where your clone is?

This is an answer to the rest of your post.

But again, that would be the exact same if the mind was limited to physical processes.
Your thought experiment does not distinguish between physical and non-physical consciousnesses.

 

[Speakpigeon]

Suppose further that the two clones wouldn't explode. What then?
EB

So we create a replica of a person by copying one person and projecting this copy into the same position but in a different phase. Like kitty pride of the X-men, or some fairly poorly-explained episodes of Star Trek and Stargate.

We shoot one of the two with a gun that's physically in phase with only one of the two subjects, but visible to both.

What happens then is that the survivor, who saw the gun pointed at him, saw the discharge and heard the bullet hit meat, but remains alive, needs to change his underwear.

Pretty close but we need to look at what happens before one of them is dead since it's a question about consciousness and not all of you will accept that a dead person possesses consciousness.

Further, the OP doesn't require that both twins (or clones) necessarily hear the death sentence (never mind the actual shot). We just need the one concerned to hear it.

So?
EB

 

[Keith&Co.]

If you are saying that I am right and so is a physicalist, then you are really saying that the physicalist is wrong.

Nope. Just saying that your thought experiment doesn't prove what you think it proves.

You've proven that your animal is an animal. YOu haven't proven that it's not a fox.

 

[Speakpigeon]

As I said, for the sake of the argument, suppose we can create two clones, the exact copy of some original, and have them at the exact same spot. Suppose further this doesn't make them explode. Everything looks the same to both but they can't interact with each other. Now, one of them is sentenced to death.

Then what?
EB

Anything you like. Once you suspend physical law, all possibilities are equally reasonable.

Lazzy bones you are.

The point is to show there is an impossibility even with these premises.

Also, physical laws are just in your dreams so I don't care if I suspend them. All there is is something like nature but how much do you know about it?
EB