My New Argument for a Nonphysical Consciousness

[Juma]

What? Suppose the world doesnt work as it does... What then?
Do you realize how silly that question is?

You're making a fool of yourself.

I'm not the one looking foolish.
We are discussing the reality. That two identical bodies cannot be at the exact same spot is such a real fact. Deal with it.

 

[Juma]

I am not saying that the person in sidney is experiencing in perth.

I don't think you were saying that. I think you were avoiding my post by saying that "you" is a name for either twin.

There are two persons. One in sidney and one in perth.
Do you agree ?

yes

So what is your problem?

 

[bigfield]

You are implying that:

1. A person's identity entails a series of contiguous brain states, and

2. The states of the cloned brain are not contiguous with the states of the original brain before the cloning event.

Your position is indistinguishable from the physicalist position that the mind is inseparable from the brain, and creating a new brain, even a clone of a existing brain, also creates a new personal identity.

But all physicalists must share a minimum of one thing in common. All physically identical worlds must be exactly the same in any other respect.

If you are saying that I am right and so is a physicalist, then you are really saying that the physicalist is wrong.

You claimed that the original brain gets the identity that existed previously, while the clone does not:

The reality is that you are not experiencing in Perth.

The simplest explanation for that claim is that you think that the mind supervenes the brain, and therefore there is no reason to postulate a supernatural essence/soul that exists independently of the brain.

 

[Keith&Co.]

Pretty close but we need to look at what happens before one of them is dead since it's a question about consciousness and not all of you will accept that a dead person possesses consciousness.

Further, the OP doesn't require that both twins (or clones) necessarily hear the death sentence (never mind the actual shot). We just need the one concerned to hear it.

So?
EB

Tough room....

 

[Speakpigeon]

Imagine they make a clone of you. Then they say that they must kill the clone. You are both in separate but exactly identical environments. When asked which one is the real you, you will both claim to be the original. But only one of you are actually the original.

Of course, we will also give the same answer if both of us are clones. So the idea that one is the original is not critical to your argument.
Or, your thought experiment will not allow anyone to distinguish between the three (original, copy, copy).

Yep.

This is called "fungibility". I have $10 on my bank account because ten people put one dollar each into it. But which of the dollars on my bank account now comes from which of my benefactors? Answer: that's not really a sensible question.
EB

 

[bilby]

I always make a record of the serial numbers on any banknotes I deposit, so that when I make a withdrawal, I can check that the bank gave me back my money, and not someone else's.

I give it to them for safekeeping. They have a duty not to mix it up or lose it.

 

[Speakpigeon]

Of course, we will also give the same answer if both of us are clones. So the idea that one is the original is not critical to your argument.
Or, your thought experiment will not allow anyone to distinguish between the three (original, copy, copy).
But how does this argue leap to an assumption that the consciousness is the non-physical difference?

How's this. Please consider your thought experiment, but also assume at the beginning that the mind IS merely the artifact of the processes in the physical brain.
How does your thought experiment turn out any differently?

If everything is cloned, then the consciousness is only a clone too. Everything about the original is the original including the mind. But somehow the two minds are different.

No.

The clones' minds will be initially identical. Then some tribunal sentences one of the clones to death. At this point the two clones become necessarily different. Not just their minds, their brains to.

Which of course doesn't prove as you seem to believe that the mind is necessarily something else than a property of the brain.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

I always make a record of the serial numbers on any banknotes I deposit, so that when I make a withdrawal, I can check that the bank gave me back my money, and not someone else's.

I give it to them for safekeeping. They have a duty not to mix it up or lose it.

Har har.

But I said bank account, not safety deposit. In a safety deposit, you can indeed leave particular dollar bills for safekeeping. Not on a bank account though.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

You're making a fool of yourself.

I'm not the one looking foolish.
We are discussing the reality. That two identical bodies cannot be at the exact same spot is such a real fact. Deal with it.

I already dealt with it. You are making a fool of yourself.
EB

 

[Juma]

I'm not the one looking foolish.
We are discussing the reality. That two identical bodies cannot be at the exact same spot is such a real fact. Deal with it.

I already dealt with it. You are making a fool of yourself.
EB

What is YOUR problem? We have a discussion with ryan here and you just trash it with totally unrelated questions.
There is noone here except Ryan that believs that mind is not a property of the brain.

 

[Speakpigeon]

It is a bad example for there is nothing strange/problematic/contradictional in it.
The minds are not different. The minds are exact copies.

The only difference is in the history and how you refer to them.

So everything is fine. Now move on to a real problem...

But for the time that you and your clone are alive, your clone is experiencing where it is, and you are experiencing where you are. Say you are in Sydney, and your clone is in Perth. You are conscious in Sydney, but your clone is conscious in Perth. This is an objective truth.

How do you know you would be the original? How would the other guy knows he is the clone?

The crucial point is that our identity is entirely in our memories and current sensations, ideas, feelings, perceptions etc. Considering current science, a clone would be immediately different from the original because even if absolutely identical down to the molecule as you assumed in the OP they would be located in different places relative to the environment so they would have at least different visual perceptions for example. So your thought experiment doesn't work if their initial locations are different. So, let's assume their initial locations are also identical, current scientific beliefs notwithstanding. Initially, we may assume they are in exactly the same state physically. Subjectively, they would also be in exactly the same state. Here it doesn't matter that we have two people rather than one. Within the narrow time window of the initial state, nobody could make a distinction between the two. Now, suppose one just stay put in Perth and the other move over to Sidney. Now they are different, both their brains and their minds are different because of the difference in their perception, sensations, ideas, memories etc. And they will be different as soon as one moves away. Now, given how the clone would have been created, how could anyone tell which one is the original, which one is the clone? Outside observers don't know and the two subjects don't either. Each is probably convinced he is the original but they would have no possible proof. If they are intelligent enough, they'll understand they may no be the original or better still, the question has no answer. Yet, they would be different. And this difference will be the cause for their minds to be different. One will conceive of himself as "me in Perth", while the other will conceive of himself as "me in Sidney". There're different. So again, your OP's assumption of them being identical to the molecule wouldn't work. Now, for the government to choose, randomly or not, one of them, you need this difference. If they were identical and in the same location, the government would say that there are not two people but one since they would be indistinguishable, and if they accept there are two people they could not choose one to sentence him to death. So you need one of the subjects to move away so they would become different to allow the government to sentence one to death. But then they would be different and again your OP's assumption is falsified.

It just doesn't work.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

I already dealt with it. You are making a fool of yourself.
EB

What is YOUR problem?

Just put Disney Channel and relax.

We have a discussion with ryan here and you just trash it with totally unrelated questions.

They were not only related but to the point.

And of course I'm not asking you to comment on my posts when they don't mention you. Don't come complaining if you do.

There is noone here except Ryan that believs that mind is not a property of the brain.

You choose to comment on my response (although it didn't mention you) to a post by bilby. Your comment only contained an insult and utter gibberish.

I know you like facts so I said it was gibberish and that you were making a fool of yourself, which was true.

Garbage in, garbage out.
EB

 

[Juma]

What is YOUR problem?

Just put Disney Channel and relax.

We have a discussion with ryan here and you just trash it with totally unrelated questions.

They were not only related by to the point.

And of course I'm not asking you to comment on my posts when they don't mention you. Don't come complaining if you do.

There is noone here except Ryan that believs that mind is not a property of the brain.

You choose to comment on my response (although it didn't mention you) to a post by bilby. Your comment only contained an insult and utter gibberish.

I know you like facts so I said it was gibberish and that you were making a fool of yourself, which was true.

Garbage in, garbage out.
EB

Just stop it. The garbage was due to a mistake and I agree that that part of text is unintelligable but your remark on that is not what I remarked on. I didnt call you a fool, just that your request to disregard realty was folly.
Then you responded by calling me a fool, which is totally uncalled for. You seem to be on a bit too high horses so I will ignore any responses to this.

 

[ryan]

No, god is the one who knows the true reality. I am god in this thought experiment, and I am telling you what is. And we know that this is theoretically possible.

As you said yourself, there is an obvious physical difference between the two copies in the four dimensional view.

You appear to be seeking a problem where none exists.

Two individuals; two consciousnesses. If the two individuals are sufficiently similar then we can infer that they likely have the same thoughts and memories. From the perspective of an outside observer, they may be hard to tell apart. But each one is his own 'I'. As are we all. People do not have direct access to any consciousness other than that arising from their own brain. This is completely consistent with the idea that consciousness is a property of physical brains.

Where, exactly, is the problem with any of this?

Since when does the history of something add any information to what it is? How does history add any physical properties to what it is now?

It doesn't.

Let's try this again without the preamble that seems to have you confused:

Two individuals; two consciousnesses. If the two individuals are sufficiently similar then we can infer that they likely have the same thoughts and memories. From the perspective of an outside observer, they may be hard to tell apart. But each one is his own 'I'. As are we all. People do not have direct access to any consciousness other than that arising from their own brain. This is completely consistent with the idea that consciousness is a property of physical brains.

I agree that the consciousness is a property of the brain. Of course the physicality dictates the what we experience. Secondly, this post totally agrees with my argument. Your I is in Sydney. There is something about your I that isn't the I in Perth. This something is continuity. But continuity already happened. So there shouldn't be a difference, but reality preserves the truth.

 

[ryan]

But again, that would be the exact same if the mind was limited to physical processes.
Your thought experiment does not distinguish between physical and non-physical consciousnesses.

The first half of this thread I talked about this being a subjective inference. From a strictly objective point of view, I agree that there is no difference. But because there is this subjective entity, which I believe is the non-physical phenomenon at the heart of this argument, we have to take a subjective and an objective account for what happens to the clone or original.

The subjective account is that you are experiencing in Sydney, and you are not experiencing in Perth. The objective account is that 2 identical objects are in different environments.

Your argument denies the first person point of view.

 

[ryan]

I don't think you were saying that. I think you were avoiding my post by saying that "you" is a name for either twin.

There are two persons. One in sidney and one in perth.
Do you agree ?

yes

So what is your problem?

My problem is that your side of the argument tends to shift to a purely objective reality when it suits your case. This is probably not something you're aware of, and god knows it has tricked me in the past. But this time I am aware of it.

 

[Keith&Co.]

But because there is this subjective entity, which I believe is the non-physical phenomenon at the heart of this argument, we have to take a subjective and an objective account for what happens to the clone or original.

So, your thought experiment for a nonphysical mind only works if we assume a nonphysical mind.

Your argument denies the first person point of view.

I deny that the first person POV would be different if the mind was non-physical or physical. The subjective point of view does not change because of the nature of the mind attached to that POV.

 

[ryan]

But for the time that you and your clone are alive, your clone is experiencing where it is, and you are experiencing where you are. Say you are in Sydney, and your clone is in Perth. You are conscious in Sydney, but your clone is conscious in Perth. This is an objective truth.

How do you know you would be the original? How would the other guy knows he is the clone?

The crucial point is that our identity is entirely in our memories and current sensations, ideas, feelings, perceptions etc. Considering current science, a clone would be immediately different from the original because even if absolutely identical down to the molecule as you assumed in the OP they would be located in different places relative to the environment so they would have at least different visual perceptions for example. So your thought experiment doesn't work if their initial locations are different. So, let's assume their initial locations are also identical, current scientific beliefs notwithstanding. Initially, we may assume they are in exactly the same state physically. Subjectively, they would also be in exactly the same state. Here it doesn't matter that we have two people rather than one. Within the narrow time window of the initial state, nobody could make a distinction between the two. Now, suppose one just stay put in Perth and the other move over to Sidney. Now they are different, both their brains and their minds are different because of the difference in their perception, sensations, ideas, memories etc. And they will be different as soon as one moves away. Now, given how the clone would have been created, how could anyone tell which one is the original, which one is the clone? Outside observers don't know and the two subjects don't either. Each is probably convinced he is the original but they would have no possible proof. If they are intelligent enough, they'll understand they may no be the original or better still, the question has no answer. Yet, they would be different. And this difference will be the cause for their minds to be different. One will conceive of himself as "me in Perth", while the other will conceive of himself as "me in Sidney". There're different. So again, your OP's assumption of them being identical to the molecule wouldn't work. Now, for the government to choose, randomly or not, one of them, you need this difference. If they were identical and in the same location, the government would say that there are not two people but one since they would be indistinguishable, and if they accept there are two people they could not choose one to sentence him to death. So you need one of the subjects to move away so they would become different to allow the government to sentence one to death. But then they would be different and again your OP's assumption is falsified.

It just doesn't work.
EB

It is hard to just jump into a thread this long because the argument has evolved since, and I have discussed many of your objections. I am so tired of answering the same thing over and over from newcomers to the thread. You have to read a few pages back, and you will see where the argument is at now.

This is not just a lazy way to avoid a new objection. I have read all of your posts. They would have been relevant in the beginning of the thread, but they aren't relevant anymore.

At some point I have to get the hell off of this forum.

 

[ryan]

But all physicalists must share a minimum of one thing in common. All physically identical worlds must be exactly the same in any other respect.

If you are saying that I am right and so is a physicalist, then you are really saying that the physicalist is wrong.

You claimed that the original brain gets the identity that existed previously, while the clone does not:

The reality is that you are not experiencing in Perth.

The simplest explanation for that claim is that you think that the mind supervenes the brain, and therefore there is no reason to postulate a supernatural essence/soul that exists independently of the brain.

But one supervenient mind has a true identity, and nobody can know this with a physical assessment.

 

[ryan]

So, your thought experiment for a nonphysical mind only works if we assume a nonphysical mind.

Okay, that was funny even though I disagree with your assessment.

As this argument evolves, I am realizing more and more that this is really just about identity. So then this means that I am really saying that everything has a non-physical identity. Everything has something non-physical about it.

Your argument denies the first person point of view.

I deny that the first person POV would be different if the mind was non-physical or physical. The subjective point of view does not change because of the nature of the mind attached to that POV.

No, but there is a true objective identity.