My New Argument for a Nonphysical Consciousness

[Juma]

I don't think you were saying that. I think you were avoiding my post by saying that "you" is a name for either twin.

There are two persons. One in sidney and one in perth.
Do you agree ?

yes

So what is your problem?

My problem is that your side of the argument tends to shift to a purely objective reality when it suits your case. This is probably not something you're aware of, and god knows it has tricked me in the past. But this time I am aware of it.

No. You answered the wrong question. My question was in the context of your example, not if you have problem with my argiment:

what is it in your example that is a contradiction?

 

[Keith&Co.]

No, but there is a true objective identity.

And you can tell this how?

Seriously, how would the experiment be different if identity is physical or non-physical? What changes? The subjective POV is still restricted to the inside of the skull in all participants.

Say that I find that 10% of humans have a nonphysical identity. I clone one of those. I also clone one of the 90%, whose identity is purely a brainal quality. So I have four test subjects and threaten to kill the clones of the two originals.
How does the Original 10's subjective experience differ from the Original 90's experience, or from either Copy 10's or Copy 90's experience?

Where does the non-physical identity show? As far as I can tell, your experiment will produce the same results for all four subjects. Each will maintain they are the original. No one will be able to accurately label the four subjects as to 10 or 90, original or copy.

The only place there's a difference is in your head and only due to you having already decided there should be a difference.

 

[ryan]

My problem is that your side of the argument tends to shift to a purely objective reality when it suits your case. This is probably not something you're aware of, and god knows it has tricked me in the past. But this time I am aware of it.

No. You answered the wrong question. My question was in the context of your example, not if you have problem with my argiment:

what is it in your example that is a contradiction?

Objectively, the subjectivity has a different identity. Mind in Sydney = mind in Perth. But their identities are different.

 

[ryan]

No, but there is a true objective identity.

And you can tell this how?

Seriously, how would the experiment be different if identity is physical or non-physical? What changes? The subjective POV is still restricted to the inside of the skull in all participants.

Say that I find that 10% of humans have a nonphysical identity. I clone one of those. I also clone one of the 90%, whose identity is purely a brainal quality. So I have four test subjects and threaten to kill the clones of the two originals.
How does the Original 10's subjective experience differ from the Original 90's experience, or from either Copy 10's or Copy 90's experience?

Where does the non-physical identity show? As far as I can tell, your experiment will produce the same results for all four subjects. Each will maintain they are the original. No one will be able to accurately label the four subjects as to 10 or 90, original or copy.

The only place there's a difference is in your head and only due to you having already decided there should be a difference.

If your identity was somehow switched with the other body, then that is something that has happened. Yet there does not need to be a physical trace that this happened.

 

[Juma]

No. You answered the wrong question. My question was in the context of your example, not if you have problem with my argiment:

what is it in your example that is a contradiction?

Objectively, the subjectivity has a different identity. Mind in Sydney = mind in Perth. But their identities are different.

Yes. No contradiction there. Now show the conttadiction.

 

[Keith&Co.]

If your identity was somehow switched with the other body, then that is something that has happened. Yet there does not need to be a physical trace that this happened.

Switched? My identity is created by my accessible memories. There's nothing to 'switch.' All four brains will produce two identical identities, until the different experiences start to accumulate and produce different memories.

But still, i'm not specifically asking for a physical trace of this nonphysical identity. I'm asking you what sort of reason you may have to assert that there's a difference between the identities that has anything to do with a non-physical mind.

 

[ryan]

Objectively, the subjectivity has a different identity. Mind in Sydney = mind in Perth. But their identities are different.

Yes. No contradiction there. Now show the conttadiction.

{Mind in Sydney + identity A} does not equal {mind in Perth + identity B}

 

[ryan]

If your identity was somehow switched with the other body, then that is something that has happened. Yet there does not need to be a physical trace that this happened.

Switched? My identity is created by my accessible memories. There's nothing to 'switch.' All four brains will produce two identical identities, until the different experiences start to accumulate and produce different memories.

But still, i'm not specifically asking for a physical trace of this nonphysical identity. I'm asking you what sort of reason you may have to assert that there's a difference between the identities that has anything to do with a non-physical mind.

Like I posted to Juma, one mind is not totally equivalent to the other mind. There is a non-physical difference.

 

[Juma]

Yes. No contradiction there. Now show the conttadiction.

{Mind in Sydney + identity A} does not equal {mind in Perth + identity B}

That is because the identity differ. And that is because they are two different objects.
You see, Identity is like numbers: they are a result of the observers mind. They are created when someone observe things. More exact: they are created when an observer distinguisg features of the universe groups them and calls that group an object.

(I'm ignoring the unortodox, mildly stated, use of "+")

 

[ryan]

{Mind in Sydney + identity A} does not equal {mind in Perth + identity B}

That is because the identity differ. And that is because they are two different objects.
You see, Identity is like numbers: they are a result of the observers mind. They are created when someone observe things.

But like I said earlier today, you are not taking subjectivity into account with objectivity.

More exact: they are created when an observer distinguisg features of the universe groups them and calls that group an object.

But unlike randomly defined objects in the universe, there is also a discrete object called the mind that is on a different level than pure objectivity. It must be an object that exists in association with another object, in this case the brain. The mind is not a recognized entity from a strictly objective point of view. This might be a whole other argument for a non-physical mind, but it is still an argument.

 

[Juma]

The mind is not a recognized entity from a strictly objective point of view. .

This a totally unsupported statement.

And:
You have yet to formulate a contradiction.

 

[Keith&Co.]

Switched? My identity is created by my accessible memories. There's nothing to 'switch.' All four brains will produce two identical identities, until the different experiences start to accumulate and produce different memories.

But still, i'm not specifically asking for a physical trace of this nonphysical identity. I'm asking you what sort of reason you may have to assert that there's a difference between the identities that has anything to do with a non-physical mind.

Like I posted to Juma, one mind is not totally equivalent to the other mind. There is a non-physical difference.

Well, yes. You have two minds that are not the same mind.
Why would you assume they would be equivalent if the physicalists were correct?

Maybe you should explain what you mean by 'equals' in this case.

 

[bilby]

No, god is the one who knows the true reality. I am god in this thought experiment, and I am telling you what is. And we know that this is theoretically possible.

As you said yourself, there is an obvious physical difference between the two copies in the four dimensional view.

You appear to be seeking a problem where none exists.

Two individuals; two consciousnesses. If the two individuals are sufficiently similar then we can infer that they likely have the same thoughts and memories. From the perspective of an outside observer, they may be hard to tell apart. But each one is his own 'I'. As are we all. People do not have direct access to any consciousness other than that arising from their own brain. This is completely consistent with the idea that consciousness is a property of physical brains.

Where, exactly, is the problem with any of this?

Since when does the history of something add any information to what it is? How does history add any physical properties to what it is now?

It doesn't.

Let's try this again without the preamble that seems to have you confused:

Two individuals; two consciousnesses. If the two individuals are sufficiently similar then we can infer that they likely have the same thoughts and memories. From the perspective of an outside observer, they may be hard to tell apart. But each one is his own 'I'. As are we all. People do not have direct access to any consciousness other than that arising from their own brain. This is completely consistent with the idea that consciousness is a property of physical brains.

I agree that the consciousness is a property of the brain. Of course the physicality dictates the what we experience. Secondly, this post totally agrees with my argument. Your I is in Sydney. There is something about your I that isn't the I in Perth. This something is continuity. But continuity already happened. So there shouldn't be a difference, but reality preserves the truth.

That's not the difference. Continuity is not even necessary. Nor is it commonplace.

I don't have continuity of consciousness with myself from yesterday - I have been asleep since then.

The consciousness is a property of the brain. The consciousness in Perth is specific to the brain in Perth because they are in the same place. They cannot fail to be, as one is a property of the other.

If you have two identical red balls, one in Perth and one in Sydney, the redness of the ball in Perth is in Perth.

If you have two identical conscious brains, one in Perth and one in Sydney, the consciousness of the brain in Perth is in Perth.

It's that simple.

 

[ryan]

The mind is not a recognized entity from a strictly objective point of view. .

This a totally unsupported statement.

Would an alien from a totally different universe recognize that minds exist on sensory alone? No they wouldn't.
The point is that minds don't need to exist objectively.

And:
You have yet to formulate a contradiction.

I already showed you the equation. And then you seemed to reinforce my argument.

 

[ryan]

Like I posted to Juma, one mind is not totally equivalent to the other mind. There is a non-physical difference.

Well, yes. You have two minds that are not the same mind.
Why would you assume they would be equivalent if the physicalists were correct?

If they are not equivalent, then the physicalists are wrong.

Maybe you should explain what you mean by 'equals' in this case.

I mean equivalence in this case to mean two identical entities in every way.

 

[ryan]

No, god is the one who knows the true reality. I am god in this thought experiment, and I am telling you what is. And we know that this is theoretically possible.

As you said yourself, there is an obvious physical difference between the two copies in the four dimensional view.

You appear to be seeking a problem where none exists.

Two individuals; two consciousnesses. If the two individuals are sufficiently similar then we can infer that they likely have the same thoughts and memories. From the perspective of an outside observer, they may be hard to tell apart. But each one is his own 'I'. As are we all. People do not have direct access to any consciousness other than that arising from their own brain. This is completely consistent with the idea that consciousness is a property of physical brains.

Where, exactly, is the problem with any of this?

Since when does the history of something add any information to what it is? How does history add any physical properties to what it is now?

It doesn't.

Let's try this again without the preamble that seems to have you confused:

Two individuals; two consciousnesses. If the two individuals are sufficiently similar then we can infer that they likely have the same thoughts and memories. From the perspective of an outside observer, they may be hard to tell apart. But each one is his own 'I'. As are we all. People do not have direct access to any consciousness other than that arising from their own brain. This is completely consistent with the idea that consciousness is a property of physical brains.

I agree that the consciousness is a property of the brain. Of course the physicality dictates the what we experience. Secondly, this post totally agrees with my argument. Your I is in Sydney. There is something about your I that isn't the I in Perth. This something is continuity. But continuity already happened. So there shouldn't be a difference, but reality preserves the truth.

That's not the difference. Continuity is not even necessary. Nor is it commonplace.

I don't have continuity of consciousness with myself from yesterday - I have been asleep since then.

The consciousness is a property of the brain. The consciousness in Perth is specific to the brain in Perth because they are in the same place. They cannot fail to be, as one is a property of the other.

If you have two identical red balls, one in Perth and one in Sydney, the redness of the ball in Perth is in Perth.

If you have two identical conscious brains, one in Perth and one in Sydney, the consciousness of the brain in Perth is in Perth.

It's that simple.

You don't like its identity by an interval of continuity A because it doesn't 't show up in your physical account when comparing it to something with continuity B. Furthermore, there is also an objective truth that the mind in Sydney has different identity that the mind in Perth. I now have two different arguments for a non-physical difference.

And for the love of sweet sweet Jesus, can you please clean up the continuity of the older posts.

 

[Kharakov]

What exactly is non-physical and how did you demonstrate that this non-physical substance exists?

Are you defining physical data as separate from the mind? Is physical data something along the lines of numbers that the mind doesn't feel, or matter which contains information that the mind does not feel, etc.?

 

[bilby]

That's not the difference. Continuity is not even necessary. Nor is it commonplace.

I don't have continuity of consciousness with myself from yesterday - I have been asleep since then.

The consciousness is a property of the brain. The consciousness in Perth is specific to the brain in Perth because they are in the same place. They cannot fail to be, as one is a property of the other.

If you have two identical red balls, one in Perth and one in Sydney, the redness of the ball in Perth is in Perth.

If you have two identical conscious brains, one in Perth and one in Sydney, the consciousness of the brain in Perth is in Perth.

It's that simple.

You don't like its identity by an interval of continuity

It doesn't matter what anyone 'likes'. It is not logically possible that one's sense identity is due to continuity of consciousness, because we observe that our own consciousness is discontinuous; and that nonetheless our sense of identity remains.

A because it doesn't 't show up in your physical account when comparing it to something with continuity

I cannot parse this. There are too many 'its', and 'somethings'; could you please re-phrase with some nouns for me?

B. Furthermore, there is also an objective truth that the mind in Sydney has different identity that the mind in Perth.

Of course it fucking does. It is a physically different object! If you have two identical copies, you have two objects; so you have two sets of attributes.

I now have two different arguments for a non-physical difference.

Then for the love of Christ present one or both of them for discussion!!

And for the love of sweet sweet Jesus, can you please clean up the continuity of the older posts.

Says the person who just posted, but failed to do so himself

 

[ryan]

What exactly is non-physical and how did you demonstrate that this non-physical substance exists?

Are you defining physical data as separate from the mind? Is physical data something along the lines of numbers that the mind doesn't feel, or matter which contains information that the mind does not feel, etc.?

That's not what I am arguing about. To sum it up, your identity is different than a perfect clone of you. Yet you are physically the same.

 

[ryan]

You don't like its identity by an interval of continuity

It doesn't matter what anyone 'likes'. It is not logically possible that one's sense identity is due to continuity of consciousness, because we observe that our own consciousness is discontinuous; and that nonetheless our sense of identity remains.

That's why I said I now have two arguments. And you seem to be acknowledging them both indirectly.

A because it doesn't 't show up in your physical account when comparing it to something with continuity

I cannot parse this. There are too many 'its', and 'somethings'; could you please re-phrase with some nouns for me?

You mean proper nouns instead of pronouns [... with a smug smile].

Okay, "it" = the non-physical entity, and something is not suppose to be a pronoun for anything.

B. Furthermore, there is also an objective truth that the mind in Sydney has different identity that the mind in Perth.

Of course it fucking does. It is a physically different object! If you have two identical copies, you have two objects; so you have two sets of attributes.

How are they physically different?