Subsymbolic
Screwtape
- Joined
- Nov 23, 2017
- Messages
- 806
- Location
- Under the Gnomon
- Basic Beliefs
- Beliefs are an ancient theory of brain content which would be ripe for rejection except it's the idiom in which we came to know ourselves and thus elimination is problematic. We make it up from there
My certainty is in knowing how we can make statements about understandings of natural phenomena.
We make them within models.
And not without them.
Perhaps explaining the relevance of this metaphysical statement and then, you know arguing for it rather than stating it dogmatically.
You cannot make any objective statements about consciousness based only on subjective reports.
You certainly can. You can make objective statements about the reports of how their conscious experience seemed to them. You are simply confused about what Libet is trying to achieve here. He doesn't care if these reports are true, in fact one of the things he is demonstrating is the gap between how things are reported to seem and the biology.
Less yet on guessing about the timing of decisions.
Perhaps it would be helpful if you told me precisely which set of experiments you are talking about.
They are random and there are too many variables that cannot be accounted for.
Random? that's an interesting claim...
Some feel pain when you push so hard and others don't feel much at all.
It's amazing that you can reject something in paragraph one and rely on it a few paragraphs later, please try to be at least internally consistent. Even if you were, it's still the case that Libet isn't interested in what people feel, but what they report they seem to feel. These are not the same thing. One is phenomenology and one is heterophenomenology, to use Dennett's terminology.
You need a testable model to make objective statements.
Other metaphysics are available - falsification, coherence and so on.
And with consciousness you need a physiological model not subjective statements or guesses.
I don't think you do, perhaps connecting consciousness with its putative neural correlates needs that, but consciousness is a mental event that rather resists all that, which is probably why Libet is only interested in verbal and behavioural reports of how it seemed. There's a difference, A difference you are still not seeing.
Progress in producing a working model to explain how some activity results in conscious animal experience has not progressed very far.
Sure, but that's not what Libet is trying to do as I have explained multiple times.
There is no working model that comes close to explaining the phenomena.
Well, there is, but that's not remotely relevant to this discussion.
So we are left with researchers who must do something. So they time subjective guesses to the millisecond to mark time.
As I said, perhaps a link to the particular experiment that you are misunderstanding would be helpful...