There isn't really a 'freewill problem'.

[Speakpigeon]

I am not assuming anything.

We can imagine the choice is free.

Or we can say the universe planned it at it's inception.

Take your pick.

Either this is a false dichotomy fallacy; or you are a moron.

Take your pick.

That's a false dichotomy.
EB

Indeed. It's intended as an example of such.

I thought so.

So, it's a true false dichotomy.
EB

 

[ruby sparks]

Surely it either is or it isn't a true false dichotomy?

 

[untermensche]

Total non sequitur.

Here's what you claim to somehow be addressing:

The woman made an argument.

If she has free will she made the argument freely.

If she does not have free will the universe had planned to make that argument, and this one, at it's inception.

Which is more likely?

Yes, that's the false dichotomy I am addressing. If she does not have free will, there are other possibilities than "the universe had planned to make that argument, and this one, at it's inception".

I even showed that it is also an unsound argument, that depends upon the unspoken premise that the woman has free will (thereby rendering the argument also circular, and hence invalid), buy replacing your chosen exemplar of an entity that we are testing for freewill (a woman) with an alternate entity that we could also test for free will (a cyclone), but which we agree does NOT have free will.

As your form of argument is able to prove that which we agree is untrue, it is shown to be unsound.

You need to learn how to use logic before trying to employ it; Or you will continue to make a fool of yourself in this way.

You introduced a completely different and irrelevant argument.

We can imagine the woman has free will. That is why we talk about it.

We cannot imagine in any way a cyclone having free will.

You have done nothing but offer a non sequitur.

 

[Kharakov]

I am not assuming anything.

We can imagine the choice is free.

Or we can say the universe planned it at it's inception.

Take your pick.

Either this is a false dichotomy fallacy; or you are a moron.

Take your pick.

You are a moron.

 

[bilby]

Yes, that's the false dichotomy I am addressing. If she does not have free will, there are other possibilities than "the universe had planned to make that argument, and this one, at it's inception".

I even showed that it is also an unsound argument, that depends upon the unspoken premise that the woman has free will (thereby rendering the argument also circular, and hence invalid), buy replacing your chosen exemplar of an entity that we are testing for freewill (a woman) with an alternate entity that we could also test for free will (a cyclone), but which we agree does NOT have free will.

As your form of argument is able to prove that which we agree is untrue, it is shown to be unsound.

You need to learn how to use logic before trying to employ it; Or you will continue to make a fool of yourself in this way.

You introduced a completely different and irrelevant argument.

We can imagine the woman has free will. That is why we talk about it.

We cannot imagine in any way a cyclone having free will.

You have done nothing but offer a non sequitur.

Your lack of imagination is not evidence for anything.

 

[Emily Lake]

The other problem being, how do you define free will? What are you talking about? The ability of a brain to make decisions? Something else?

The ability to make decisions, including the ability to extrapolate prior experiences, hypothetical experiences, and vicarious experiences within that decision-making process.

ETA: Added tweak to this is the assumption that the alternative options within the decision set are real and *could* actually have been chosen. My objection to determinism isn't based around the functionality of decision making... it's around the assumption that choice is an illusion, and that the actor could only possibly have chosen exactly what they did and nothing else - that all the other options are illusory and that the act of making a decision is a massive and persistent delusion shared by all humans throughout all of known history.

 

[Emily Lake]

I have been airing my views on this forum for ages now and I still haven't seen any convincing rebuttal.
EB

And you never will. When your starting point is that nothing is really "real" and it's all a "model", there is no possible way to convince you otherwise. Your premise is one of raw belief... and that's not really subject to argument.

 

[PyramidHead]

That's better.

No need to worry, though. Our belief in the reality of the world out there is truly unshakeable and will always be stronger than any of our theoretical views.

Still, you haven't really provided any objections to my specific arguments. You've just reaffirmed your conviction.

Also, you didn't even try to show how my views would really be nonsensical.

I have been airing my views on this forum for ages now and I still haven't seen any convincing rebuttal.
EB

The existence of models requires the existence of something they are attempting to model. It doesn't mean this second thing is what we think it is (made of stuff, out there, etc.) but it's a thing and not just a contrivance, otherwise the fact that some models are very predictive of experience while others are not would be impossible to reconcile.

So, according to model A, I anticipate having experiences x, y, and z, but not p, q, and r. The experiences I end up having are what decides which model is more accurate, where 'accurate' just means 'predictive of what I will experience'. Many such predictive tests, across many vantage points, are what establish a model as true. All the talk about whether or not there is an outside world is just playing around with words; whether the cause of my experience (upon which I base my support or rejection of a given model) is a vast external reality or a coherent illusion of such, the answer to my question of which model to favor will still be the same.

That's all having knowledge needs to mean, it doesn't have to imply something like perfect certainty of a metaphysical sort. To know that the capital of Rhode Island is Providence does not require any background assumptions about whether Providence is a physical location somewhere in spacetime or a simulated environment created by a computer. I just predict that when I look up the capital of Rhode Island, I anticipate that it will say Providence. Multiple confirmations of this prediction and its coherence with other predictions that are similarly extensively corroborated make me confident that it is true, and the word 'knowledge' is just a label for my confidence.

 

[Treedbear]

For those of you arguing that free will doesn't exist, or that choice is an illusion...

Can you explain how imagination and invention are deterministic? Can you explain how the building of new knowledge upon prior knowledge, and the extrapolation of what is known into the realm of the not-yet-known comes to be? What mechanism separates dream from imagination?

I think imagination and invention are the result of the evolution of existing concepts and ideas. Not by "poofing" them into being like some omnipotent deity would or with the help of some otherwise free will. Intelligence itself is based on the same process as evolution. As there are no truly random events, it is deterministic all the way down to (but probably not including) the quantum level. All that's needed is a system that provides a mechanism for survival of an idea and you have it. I think that's easily managed in the neurobiological structure of a brain. Rather than "free will" I prefer "mutable will". To acknowledge changeability but not without reason. I won't give up that.

Your declaration that there are no truly random events is one that I challenge. It's an assumption on your part.

That was a minor point and I'm surprised you focused on. Random has been rejected as a source of free will going back to the ancient Greeks. But even quantum events aren't truly random. Undetermined?, probably. But above the quantum level things get very predictable. I hope that's a different discussion. So unless you have an example of a truly random, uncaused event of any other sort, I see it as a non-reasonable argument.

I don't know enough about dreaming but it seems clear that it involves the imagination. How do you mean they are separate?

You know, I don't see it that way. I tend to think that dreams are semi-random firing of neurons, which the "sapient" part of our brains tries to find pattern and meaning in. Imagination, however, is deliberate. It isn't taking a set of semi-random imagery or impressions and creating a narrative around it; rather it's creating a purposeful narrative and creating imagery and impressions to further enhance that narrative. It's the difference between picking a random selection of words from a dictionary and creating a story from them that kind of makes sense... and sitting down to intentionally write a story to convey a message or meaning.

Yes to the importance of semi-random (aka pseudo-random) neuronal interactions. Although in my opinion this aspect of the process is critcal to the decision making also. Try to envision how this occurs in biological systems in general. There are semi-random mutations which result in a diversity of possibilities which vary in their capability at thriving and/or surviving within some environment. But there's no need to infer some intention or deliberation is at work. It's an ecosystem where whatever survives is by definition successful. It's my opinion that the brain is just such a complex environment which itself has certain prerequisites for survival; the main priority being the drive to minimize energy expenditure and heat generation within the densely packed structure. Therefore it must include mechanisms by which neurons interact with some measure of efficiency. Mechanisms which evolved as the brain has grown in size and complexity. And the primary way that this is addressed is by resolving conflicts and contradictions in how the brain models the world. That is the driving force, the motivation, the source of will. But it's all based on cause and effect. Determinism. Nothing occurs without a reason, even when we don't and/or can't know the reason. That includes intention and acts of deliberation. That's a good thing.

 

[Treedbear]

The other problem being, how do you define free will? What are you talking about? The ability of a brain to make decisions? Something else?

The ability to make decisions, including the ability to extrapolate prior experiences, hypothetical experiences, and vicarious experiences within that decision-making process.

ETA: Added tweak to this is the assumption that the alternative options within the decision set are real and *could* actually have been chosen. My objection to determinism isn't based around the functionality of decision making... it's around the assumption that choice is an illusion, and that the actor could only possibly have chosen exactly what they did and nothing else - that all the other options are illusory and that the act of making a decision is a massive and persistent delusion shared by all humans throughout all of known history.

This is the vexing part of the free will argument. "I could have chosen to have had chocolate instead of vanilla." I'm sorry to have to choose the trivial example everyone seems to use, but it just doesn't work well with any other type of decision. Very important decisions are very obviously determined by what the perceived outcome will be. Even to the point that it becomes controversial whether it was or wasn't a matter of free will or coercion. All choices are made under some degree of influence, external and/or internal. So "I could have" if what? I "felt" differently? But then my feelings would have to be uncaused, which is unlikely the case. Why is it desirable to have had absolutely no reason for having made a choice?

 

[Emily Lake]

The other problem being, how do you define free will? What are you talking about? The ability of a brain to make decisions? Something else?

The ability to make decisions, including the ability to extrapolate prior experiences, hypothetical experiences, and vicarious experiences within that decision-making process.

ETA: Added tweak to this is the assumption that the alternative options within the decision set are real and *could* actually have been chosen. My objection to determinism isn't based around the functionality of decision making... it's around the assumption that choice is an illusion, and that the actor could only possibly have chosen exactly what they did and nothing else - that all the other options are illusory and that the act of making a decision is a massive and persistent delusion shared by all humans throughout all of known history.

This is the vexing part of the free will argument. "I could have chosen to have had chocolate instead of vanilla." I'm sorry to have to choose the trivial example everyone seems to use, but it just doesn't work well with any other type of decision. Very important decisions are very obviously determined by what the perceived outcome will be. Even to the point that it becomes controversial whether it was or wasn't a matter of free will or coercion. All choices are made under some degree of influence, external and/or internal. So "I could have" if what? I "felt" differently? But then my feelings would have to be uncaused, which is unlikely the case. Why is it desirable to have had absolutely no reason for having made a choice?

It's not a case of having no reason for having made a choice. It's a matter of actually making a choice - of actually choosing... not having the universe dictate ones actions and then supply us all with a very complex delusion of having made a choice.

Look - a very large portion of my job revolves around doing analysis and providing information and recommendation to my business clients so that they can make an informed choice in a complex situation. By your account... everything I do for a living is an elaborate hoax perpetrated by ??? in order to make me think that I'm doing analysis, solving problems, and weighing options so that I can present a completely and totally false set of illusory options to my clients so they can pretend to make a choice, even though they don't actually have any choice and they're going to make the same choice no matter what, because it's all scripted somehow.

That approach means that somewhere around 40% of the activities that humans engage in are all mass delusions that serve no purpose. The other 60% involves autonomic functions and sleep.

It means that every word you "chose" to write, in order to "convince" me of your viewpoint is wasted time. You should totally just run on instinct, and screw all this thinking bullshit. It's all an illusion anyway, so why bother - be the smart one and cut through the delusion of choice. Just run on your gut, man! It's totally gonna free up a lot of time.

 

[DBT]

The other problem being, how do you define free will? What are you talking about? The ability of a brain to make decisions? Something else?

The ability to make decisions, including the ability to extrapolate prior experiences, hypothetical experiences, and vicarious experiences within that decision-making process.

But that has nothing to do with 'will' - our abilities are determined by neural architecture, which not a chosen condition. A Hamster, for example, is able to to make decisions to degree that a Hamster brain enables decision making, very little if anything in the way of 'hypothesis' or extrapolation. And of course, will is a consequence of a host of factors, desires, fears, needs, wants, which drive decision making - according to the architecture of a brain, not will and certainly not 'free will'

Decisions, as I mentioned before, are selections made from a set of options based on a given set of criteria,which is information processing according to neural architecture. Computer software, algorithms, can do that.

ETA: Added tweak to this is the assumption that the alternative options within the decision set are real and *could* actually have been chosen. My objection to determinism isn't based around the functionality of decision making... it's around the assumption that choice is an illusion, and that the actor could only possibly have chosen exactly what they did and nothing else - that all the other options are illusory and that the act of making a decision is a massive and persistent delusion shared by all humans throughout all of known history.

Options are there, but it is the information condition of a brain in the instance of decision making that determines the decision that is made in that instance in time.

It is only a moment later that it can realized that the decision was a mistake....fresh input constantly altering information available to the brain and the brain itself.

None of this has anything to do with free will.

 

[DBT]

I have never said otherwise....but not only observations of the natural world, but what other people have discovered....knowledge being built over time, transmitted first through observation and oral transmission then the written word, Guilds formed, etc....

What you miss is the real world direction towards an idea that only is accessible to consciousness.

An idea no evolved mechanism could force a human towards since the mechanisms preceded the idea.

Dualism again. A homunculus in the form of consciousness as the director of the brain.

 

[WAB]

Have at you!

 

[Speakpigeon]

I am not assuming anything.

We can imagine the choice is free.

Or we can say the universe planned it at it's inception.

Take your pick.

Either this is a false dichotomy fallacy; or you are a moron.

Take your pick.

You are a moron.

See how you go without even thinking for the oh-so-obvious answer!

I know it's hard to resist the temptation but you need to take a few seconds to consider whether both alternatives may be true.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

I have been airing my views on this forum for ages now and I still haven't seen any convincing rebuttal.
EB

And you never will. When your starting point is that nothing is really "real"

That's definitely not what I said.

But, never mind.

and it's all a "model", there is no possible way to convince you otherwise. Your premise is one of raw belief... and that's not really subject to argument.

Raw belief?!

That's new to me.

I'll try to use this one next time I run short of any good argument.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

That's better.

No need to worry, though. Our belief in the reality of the world out there is truly unshakeable and will always be stronger than any of our theoretical views.

Still, you haven't really provided any objections to my specific arguments. You've just reaffirmed your conviction.

Also, you didn't even try to show how my views would really be nonsensical.

I have been airing my views on this forum for ages now and I still haven't seen any convincing rebuttal.
EB

The existence of models requires the existence of something they are attempting to model. It doesn't mean this second thing is what we think it is (made of stuff, out there, etc.) but it's a thing and not just a contrivance, otherwise the fact that some models are very predictive of experience while others are not would be impossible to reconcile.

So, according to model A, I anticipate having experiences x, y, and z, but not p, q, and r. The experiences I end up having are what decides which model is more accurate, where 'accurate' just means 'predictive of what I will experience'. Many such predictive tests, across many vantage points, are what establish a model as true. All the talk about whether or not there is an outside world is just playing around with words; whether the cause of my experience (upon which I base my support or rejection of a given model) is a vast external reality or a coherent illusion of such, the answer to my question of which model to favor will still be the same.

That's all having knowledge needs to mean, it doesn't have to imply something like perfect certainty of a metaphysical sort. To know that the capital of Rhode Island is Providence does not require any background assumptions about whether Providence is a physical location somewhere in spacetime or a simulated environment created by a computer. I just predict that when I look up the capital of Rhode Island, I anticipate that it will say Providence. Multiple confirmations of this prediction and its coherence with other predictions that are similarly extensively corroborated make me confident that it is true, and the word 'knowledge' is just a label for my confidence.

That's clearly not true.

First, it's just obviously untrue that "The existence of models requires the existence of something they are attempting to model". Hallucinations are straightforward examples of models that don't have any reference whatsoever.

Second, what is it you're supposed to know when you say "Providence is the capital of Rhode Island"? My guess is that very nearly everybody does mean the metaphysical view that there's a whole physical world out there with a big planet Earth wholly made of the stuff we call matter and somewhere on it, an expanse of houses and streets and an administrative and political body to manage and control things around the area. Even me, it's what I would mean by it.

Third, past predictive success doesn't guaranty future predictive success. We all have the experience that we can't trust experience. That's our experience. Including for scientists. If you trust experience, you should know you should distrust experience. You know, "so far so good, so far so good, etc..."

Fourth, obviously, success in predictive tests gives us confidence and confidence leads us to declare our model true. Yet, it's not because we think and say it's true that it is.

Fifth, how could you possibly know that your second-level impression that your first-level impression that experience confirms your model is proof that there's something out there that conforms to your model? I would grant you that it can look very convincing and there's nothing else to do in fact than go along with this impression. Yet, I really don't see why it would be impossible for this impression to totally imaginary. If it is, what's going to stop you wrongly believing it's true?

Sixth, my point here is that all our ideas about the world out there are impressions, including our impression that prediction is confirmed by experience (whenever it is) because the idea that prediction is confirmed by experience is itself an idea about the world out there. So, the flaw in your argument is to assume you know something about the world out there, i.e. that some predictions are confirmed by experience, and then you infer that you necessarily know something about the world out there. That looks very circular to me.

Of course, our impressions might well be true. I'm not denying that. In fact, I can't stop myself believing that. But, it's not because that's what I believe that it is true.

And it's also not because the impression I believe is true is indeed true that I know it's true. The impression I believe is true may indeed be true without my belief magically morphing somehow into true knowledge.

Seventh, what's wrong with just believing? We can believe we have good reasons. If we do, we will usually act accordingly. That's certainly what I do myself and I believe it works. We also believe that when we have good reasons we can convince other people and that they will act accordingly. And so life goes on in an all-too-believable world. What's wrong with this belief-based model? What's missing that would somehow require us to claim knowledge as necessary?

8th, just give me one instance of something we both know is real?
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

Oh, Gosh! Such a long time ago. I want to laugh and I want to cry.

Probably a false dichotomy.

Bastard!
EB

 

[PyramidHead]

First:

Hallucinations are straightforward examples of models that don't have any reference whatsoever.

Sure they do. They refer to whatever image or impression is created in the mind by the hallucination. The model I create of my environment when I think the room is spinning is a representation of my sensation of vertigo and how it relates to my ability to navigate. I may THINK it's about the actual world, but I can be wrong about that like anything else. The point is that there's no meaningful way to talk about a model that isn't a model of _______.

Second:

Second, what is it you're supposed to know when you say "Providence is the capital of Rhode Island"?

People make a lot of noises about the metaphysical side of things, but in the end all they can possibly mean is something about their internal experience, and how it might be expected to change under certain circumstances. The metaphysical framework is only a mental projection, in other words, a helpful way of describing the content of experience and how experiences are related to one another. A world in which there is nothing "out there" would be empirically indistinguishable from a "full" world, provided the experience of interacting with (whatever we believe to be) our environment is the same.

Third:

We all have the experience that we can't trust experience.

And knowledge is not a guarantee of absolute certainty, just a way of labeling claims that have passed a generally acknowledged threshold of evidence. I think you're asking too much of the concept of knowledge.

Fourth:

uccess in predictive tests gives us confidence and confidence leads us to declare our model true. Yet, it's not because we think and say it's true that it is.

I wouldn't say a model is declared "true", it's just given the stamp of being a successful predictor of experience that doesn't need any more testing unless there is a significant anomaly. It's okay to say something is true even if we can't be certain that it's true.

Fifth:

I really don't see why it would be impossible for this impression to totally imaginary.

This is just Last Thursdayism. I'm not saying that's impossible, I'm saying that knowledge doesn't require the impossibility of being mistaken.

Sixth:

[M]y point here is that all our ideas about the world out there are impressions, including our impression that prediction is confirmed by experience (whenever it is) because the idea that prediction is confirmed by experience is itself an idea about the world out there.

Not really. It's actually an idea about my internal subjective state. If my hypothesis is that the sky is blue, even though I might make noises to the effect of the sky being a thing in the world that confirms my hypothesis when I look at it, all I can possibly be indicating by those noises is that I will subjectively experience the quality of seeing blue upon looking at the sky. But I think your larger point is basically just Hume's problem of induction, which honestly isn't very interesting to me. Maybe it's a real problem, but I will just go on behaving as though it isn't, and I will be fine.

Seventh:

What's wrong with this belief-based model? What's missing that would somehow require us to claim knowledge as necessary?

Plenty of people believe lots of things without justification, and it's just practical to have a word or concept that describes beliefs that have stood up to enough scrutiny for further scrutiny to be useless.

As in our previous conversations, I think we may be saying something similar but looking at it in different ways. We both agree that epistemic certainty about metaphysical propositions is impossible, but you see that as a genuine threat to knowledge and I see it as a linguistic problem with no empirical implications.

Eighth: you are real, and we both know that because we are both you, remember?

 

[Speakpigeon]

Eighth: you are real, and we both know that because we are both you

I certainly don't know you're something real out there.

And yet, if you knew I'm real, I should probably know you are.

So, no, sorry, I don't buy that.

remember?

Sure. I also remember it didn't make sense talking of your consciousness as being me.

I accept that different people's consciousnesses, at least their "bare consciousnesses", or "minimal consciousnesses", are likely identical. But that doesn't mean there is necessarily just one, unique, consciousness, for all of us.

And even if there is just one for all of us, there's no good reason to use "me" to refer to it since we use "me" to refer to our own self, not to our bare consciousness, which is not even something we normally talk about.
EB