There isn't really a 'freewill problem'.

[Emily Lake]

That seems reasonable - need to protect society balanced against diminished responsibility.

Now... IF we were to accept that human activity is perfectly determined... then it is elementary to see that everyone's responsibility in any situation is zero. Nobody would be responsible for any of their actions - they have no possibility of control, no possibility of doing other than they did. Which would argue that leniency in cases like this is pointless, and that such leniency should be shown in ALL cases.

No. You're assuming a very abstract concept of responsibility which doesn't even fit how responsibility is really considered in society. You're doing the same as what some people here are doing with free will, i.e. discussing notions made up by ideologues. Come back to Earth.
...
So, we can live with our ordinary notion of free will and our ordinary notion of responsibility. We do that every day. Nothing absurd comes out of that. It works.
EB

I'm confused here. Are you expecting me to adopt a strained and very un-ordinary concept of free will... but somehow wrap an ordinary notion of responsibility around it? Because the ordinary notion of responsibility is dependent upon the existence of the ordinary notion of free will. You can't have ordinary responsibility in a framework wherein everyone is assumed to have zero control over their actions - that wouldn't make sense at all! Which was supposed to be my point, and at which I have presumably failed

 

[ruby sparks]

And here we've come full circle to the scenario that I presented previously, and that you dismissed as absurd. In a perfectly determined framework, everyone has zero responsibility for their actions, and since each person is only able to do whatever they did... including rape and murder and child molesting... punishment of them is simply cruel. All would merit forgiveness and acceptance on the basis of them having not had any possibility of control over their actions. Punishment would be a fools errand. At the very best, you might be able to argue that removal from society for the protection of other people is justified... but no other punishment of any sort would every be logically justifiable.

Indeed, rehabilitation would be pointless. Anyone attempting to provide rehabilitation is unable to do otherwise - they are pre-ordained to attempt rehab. And any recipient of such rehab efforts would be pre-ordained to either incorporate new behaviors or not. Indeed, a perfectly deterministic framework implies that every iota of human knowledge, growth, and change is foreordained. Musk had no choice but to launch his car into space. Hitler had no choice but to attempt to exterminate people of jewish ancestry. The Unabomber had no choice but to blow up buildings. The registered sex offender down the road from you had no choice but to rape children.

Teaching that what those people did was wrong would be tantamount to teaching that left-handed people are bad or that gingers have no souls. It's irrelevant lunacy. The entire concept of morality and ethics is destroyed in a deterministic framework - morality and ethics innately depend on freedom of will and agency to choose one's actions.

I think it only seems circular to you because your thinking might be circular.

Are you stuck in a loop on this idea that if we had no free will and we all knew it, there'd be no reasons or justifications left for applying penalties and inevitably therefore no penalties? It doesn't stand up to scrutiny, imo. Let me ask you a simple question. Would a 'no punishment' society work?

I'm arguing that the entire concept of purposefully behavior modification is meaningless under a deterministic framework.

If it led to 'better' behaviour, there'd still be a use for it. What you're saying sounds like a cousin or some other relative of the worry, put about by theists, that without objective morality, morality is meaningless. As with atheism, all afreewillism would involve is that there might be different justifications for what we like to call morality. If god is gone, humans still have to get on with stuff, or perish (and we're all 'progammed' to avoid that if possible). If free will is gone, ditto. Next up for the chop: the self.

 

[ruby sparks]

To put it another way, a person's conscious decision to regulate their brain state may be the effect, and not the cause, of the brain's internal calculations leading to the initiation of breathing exercises, meditation, etc.

Exactly. How could it possibly be otherwise?

 

[ruby sparks]

Then we should abandon retributive justice. Whether or not we do so is of course determined, but that doesn't change anything. Everything you said is true, except for the unspoken assumption that praise and punishment must be preserved even in light of information that renders them pointless.

I'm more in favour of allowing what's already happening to gradually carry on, a slow drift away from a strong belief in free will, at least in 'enlightened' or 'civilised' societies, and see where that goes (so far, not too bad, which makes one wonder how much of the worries are unfounded) after the science is more developed. I think it's to early to do anything drastic. Though that said, I might actually agree with you. Retributive justice is already arguably a candidate for the bin, imo, so long as we're clear what we mean by it, that we mean that retribution (vengeance) is questionable, not that justice involving punishment is.

I find that a useful way to think about it is in machine terms. If a machine is faulty, we fix it if we can. We don't (except when we're arguably being irrational) blame the machine, try to get revenge on it or think it immoral. Now imagine a community of very sophisticated machines which live in an interactive environment with each other where one machine's actions impinge on other machines. I can't think of a good reason that given sufficient non-free will agency and machine learning capacities, they would or (from the point of view of their own benefit) should stop fixing each other (or in fact quarantining or even decommissioning the machines that can't be fixed).

 

[Treedbear]

...
If possible and probable contains more than one element in the set, then it is not deterministic. If multiple possibilities exist prior to action being taken, then that action is not deterministic. Unless you're using a special version of deterministic that is at odds with the mathematical definition.

We seem to be using different versions of possible and probable. Or perhaps only of the word possible. In my understanding both refer to a prediction of future events based on past and current conditions. They are both widely used when describing circumstances that have nothing to do with free will, but are only limited by the quality and completeness of available information. There is no Platonic idealisation of the word that is useful when describing reality. Probable is a way to assign a relative value to what is considered possible. It can change when conditions become more certain.

Okay - statistically speaking, if there is only one possible outcome (as there is by definition in the deterministic framework proposed) then the probability of that specific outcome is 100%. That necessarily implies that the probability of all other outcomes is 0% - which literally means that they are all impossible.

Meaning is derived from what has come before. I can look at statistics or historical patterns of cause and effect and assign a probability to the effect my actions might have, and on that basis decide whether to act. Rarely will that approach 100%. But whatever I decide to do will have some consequence. That is the basic premise of determinism. Are you saying that if I take some preventative action to influence future bahavior it will have no effect? Or are you saying there is nothing meaningful about doing so? You seem to want to redefine probability as an abstract concept. But then it becomes meaningless and useless.

Consider a standard six-sided die. If you assume a deterministic framework as proposed, then for any toss of the die there is one and only one face that will come up. That means that if you toss a die, then the probability of rolling a 3 is either 1 or 0. It means that the standard view of that distribution providing a 1/6th probability of rolling a 3 is false - the distribution does not exist. It means that there is no probability associated with any roll, ever. For more than one possibility to exist prior to the action taken... there must be probabilities >0 and <1 for each possibility in the likelihood set. Otherwise there is literally only one possibility. That's how statistics works.

I'll assume your aren't using this as an example of free will. Statistics don't work for a single roll of the die. While each roll can be considered as being certain for one side and impossible for the others the distribution for each side over many rolls will be close to 1/6th. And we don't happen to know which roll is next.

I tend to think that most of the people who argue for a deterministic framework are conflating a posterior observation with a prior probability. They're (errantly) assuming that because X is observed to have occurred, then P(X) = 1.

To speak in terms of the probability of a past event says nothing about the event itself, and everything about the analysis that was used to predict it.

 

[DBT]

Ok. Thanks, but that only answers the first part of my question.

If 'actual freedom' doesn't reflect common usage, bearing in mind dictionary definitions reflect common usage, from where do you get your definition of "actual" freedom?

That dictionaries reflect common usage doesn't mean that dictionaries may not include uncommon or arcane usage;

freedom
1.2 The power of self-determination attributed to the will; the quality of being independent of fate or necessity.

Why would you choose an uncommon/arcane usage to represent your notion of 'actual' freedom? (particularly when absolutely nothing in our adequately deterministic universe would qualify as 'actually' free under this definition)

This logically implies that you view common usages as not representative of 'actual' freedoms (are these illusory/mistaken?). This explains why you insist that any attempt to describe will as free in the common usage sense fails because it would not be true (actual, real?) free will.

The problem I have with your argument is that I don't accept that the common usage sense of freedom is not representative of "actual" freedom. As far as I can tell you don't provide any argument as to why your (self-confessed) uncommon/arcane usage is the only one that qualifies as "actual" freedom - you just repeatedly assert it.

It's only uncommon in relation to casual talk, casual references. It is not uncommon in relation to the subject of free will. That definition is related to the issue of free will.

I don't think that there is a definition in existence that you would consider or accept when it comes to this subject matter. One is merely common usage, the other too arcane. This doesn't suit, that doesn't relate, this is too vague, that is too strict, that doesn't apply, this is how the word is used.....

 

[DBT]

No, but the sense in which you are defining 'freedom' makes it a useless word, because nothing satisfies that definition. Is there any reason to use words that don't refer to anything when talking about commonplace things?

What is freedom if not the ability to have done otherwise under the same conditions?

As I said: that's a useless definition. Please prove me wrong by naming one thing larger than an electron that can be said to have "the ability to have done otherwise under the same conditions".

That's the point. There is nothing larger than an electron that can be said to have "the ability to have done otherwise under the same conditions"

Therefore the irrelevancy of the term free will in relation to the ability to have done otherwise under the same conditions.

So with no ability to have done otherwise under the same conditions, how exactly does will have freedom?

What would be the nature of freedom of will considering that will has no regulative control, no ability to have done otherwise in any instance in time?

 

[DBT]

I'd like you to take a moment and re-read my post, please.

Maybe you should rephrase your post - ''Brain is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the existence of a mind.'' - implies mind that is independent from brain.

Maybe you meant something else, but what that may be is not clear.

No, it most certainly does NOT imply that mind is independent from the brain. Do you seriously not understand what the term "necessary" means in that sentence?

Ahem, it's the ''but not sufficient condition'' that I am referring to and questioning.

 

[bilby]

No, it most certainly does NOT imply that mind is independent from the brain. Do you seriously not understand what the term "necessary" means in that sentence?

Ahem, it's the ''but not sufficient condition'' that I am referring to and questioning.

A fresh corpse has a brain. If that were sufficient, it would have a mind too - But I don't know of anyone who would agree that it does.

 

[The AntiChris]

Why would you choose an uncommon/arcane usage to represent your notion of 'actual' freedom? (particularly when absolutely nothing in our adequately deterministic universe would qualify as 'actually' free under this definition)

This logically implies that you view common usages as not representative of 'actual' freedoms (are these illusory/mistaken?). This explains why you insist that any attempt to describe will as free in the common usage sense fails because it would not be true (actual, real?) free will.

The problem I have with your argument is that I don't accept that the common usage sense of freedom is not representative of "actual" freedom. As far as I can tell you don't provide any argument as to why your (self-confessed) uncommon/arcane usage is the only one that qualifies as "actual" freedom - you just repeatedly assert it.

It's only uncommon in relation to casual talk, casual references. It is not uncommon in relation to the subject of free will. That definition is related to the issue of free will.

I get the impression you only skim the posts to which you respond. You're not addressing my point.

Of course, your arcane version of freedom defines libertarian free will. I'm not (and have never) disputed this. Libertarian free will is clearly impossible in our adequately deterministic universe. However libertarian free will is not the only version of free will in play.

For example, classical compatibilist free will does not require that an agent could have done otherwise in the same circumstances. It follows therefore that your arcane definition of what you call 'actual' freedom cannot be used to defeat classical compatibilist free will (this is not to say that there are no valid criticisms).

My point being that your argument that no version of free will is possible in a deterministic universe because it cannot meet your uncommon/arcane definition of freedom is simply wrong.

 

[DBT]

I get the impression you only skim the posts to which you respond. You're not addressing my point.

Time is an issue. I do what I can in the time I have. Plus I'm flying to Europe on Monday, a seven week trip, which will make it hard to focus on Internet discussions.

For example, classical compatibilist free will does not require that an agent could have done otherwise in the same circumstances. It follows therefore that your arcane definition of what you call 'actual' freedom cannot be used to defeat classical compatibilist free will (this is not to say that there are no valid criticisms).

Compatibalism comes up from time to time. Maybe you can explain why you think it works. That is, If you believe it works.

My point being that your argument that no version of free will is possible in a deterministic universe because it cannot meet your uncommon/arcane definition of freedom is simply wrong.

Not so. What is freedom if not the possibility to have done otherwise? Can you explain freedom in another way?

 

[The AntiChris]

Time is an issue.

Sorry to be brutal but that's not my problem.

I put a fair amount of thought into my posts and you're just wasting my time when you fail to address the points I raise. (I'd far prefer you took your time rather than always trying produce the snappy comeback)

Compatibalism comes up from time to time.

A poll taken in 2009 showed that nearly 60% of professional philosophers accept compatibilism. Compatibilism is discussed extensively in the philosophical literature and Google returns literally hundreds of thousand results when compatibilism is searched. And yet you continue to ignore it.

Maybe you can explain why you think it works.

What I think is quite irrelevant. In any event, if you understood compatibilism you'd know that your question makes no sense. (why is it the most fervent opponents of free will wear their ignorance of compatibilism as a kind of badge of honour? It's as though they think that their ignorance is somehow evidence that compatibilism must be wrong)

My point being that your argument that no version of free will is possible in a deterministic universe because it cannot meet your uncommon/arcane definition of freedom is simply wrong.

Not so. What is freedom if not the possibility to have done otherwise? Can you explain freedom in another way?

Of course I can. (This is an extraordinary question,we're going round in circles).

I can explain it in a way that is neither uncommon nor arcane. Aside from libertarian freedom of will, there is not a single concept of freedom in our universe that depends on the possibility to have done otherwise in the same circumstances. Any dictionary will give you a range of common usages (explanations).

 

[Speakpigeon]

I'm sure you must mean something else here.

No; I mean what I said.

Both of your proposed alternatives give the incorrect impression that quantum effects matter to large objects, such as neurons, axons, and synapses.

I'll let you sleep on it.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

That seems reasonable - need to protect society balanced against diminished responsibility.

Now... IF we were to accept that human activity is perfectly determined... then it is elementary to see that everyone's responsibility in any situation is zero. Nobody would be responsible for any of their actions - they have no possibility of control, no possibility of doing other than they did. Which would argue that leniency in cases like this is pointless, and that such leniency should be shown in ALL cases.

No. You're assuming a very abstract concept of responsibility which doesn't even fit how responsibility is really considered in society. You're doing the same as what some people here are doing with free will, i.e. discussing notions made up by ideologues. Come back to Earth.
...
So, we can live with our ordinary notion of free will and our ordinary notion of responsibility. We do that every day. Nothing absurd comes out of that. It works.
EB

I'm confused here. Are you expecting me to adopt a strained and very un-ordinary concept of free will... but somehow wrap an ordinary notion of responsibility around it? Because the ordinary notion of responsibility is dependent upon the existence of the ordinary notion of free will. You can't have ordinary responsibility in a framework wherein everyone is assumed to have zero control over their actions - that wouldn't make sense at all! Which was supposed to be my point, and at which I have presumably failed

Our ordinary notions of free will and responsibility predate our scientific claim that the world is deterministic. And yet, we've carried on pretty much as before. Even physicists do. They lead their lives in a way consistent with the belief they have both actual free will and actual responsibilities. Determinism is just irrelevant.
EB

 

[PyramidHead]

2) At least some brain state and condition IS open to conscious regulation - that's why mental rehearsing, visualization techniques, and therapy work. Not perfectly because it's a complex system... but they DO work. Meditation is conscious and purposeful and has a measurable and observable effect on brain state. Relaxation techniques, breathing exercises, etc - there is a very long list of conscious activities that LITERALLY alter brain state.

That's kind of begging the question by asserting that the techniques you mentioned are initiated by the consciousness of the person who does them, rather than being the result of inexorable brain-level responses to stimuli happening "under the hood". To put it another way, a person's conscious decision to regulate their brain state may be the effect, and not the cause, of the brain's internal calculations leading to the initiation of breathing exercises, meditation, etc.

What? Are you suggesting that conscious meditation is actually a subconscious process? Unless I'm really missing the point here (always a possibility), it would seem that your interpretation here would mean that nothing humans do is conscious, it's all non-conscious... and consciousness itself is a lie.

That's what DBT is suggesting, I believe, and what many theories of consciousness currently propose. Consciousness, according to these, is an epiphenomenon, causally inert. It's like a steering wheel that isn't actually connected to anything because the car is self-driving, but it feels nice to believe that one is controlling the car so the steering wheel stayed in.

 

[ruby sparks]

What? Are you suggesting that conscious meditation is actually a subconscious process? Unless I'm really missing the point here (always a possibility), it would seem that your interpretation here would mean that nothing humans do is conscious, it's all non-conscious... and consciousness itself is a lie.

That's what DBT is suggesting, I believe, and what many theories of consciousness currently propose. Consciousness, according to these, is an epiphenomenon, causally inert. It's like a steering wheel that isn't actually connected to anything because the car is self-driving, but it feels nice to believe that one is controlling the car so the steering wheel stayed in.

I have always found that an appealing idea, but then after a while I wasn't sure. I think one has to be careful with the 'steam engine's whistle' analogy, because it might suggest that consicousness plays no role. I think it does play a role, it's just that for me, it's still part of the causal chain of events. I think I broadly agree with you, but I have a feeling that we should add that caveat. Might it be better to say that there's no one turning the steering wheel which is connected to the wheels? Dunno.

 

[Emily Lake]

No, it most certainly does NOT imply that mind is independent from the brain. Do you seriously not understand what the term "necessary" means in that sentence?

Ahem, it's the ''but not sufficient condition'' that I am referring to and questioning.

Are you really saying that brain is both necessary and sufficient for the existence of mind? Would you then argue that an ant, because it possesses a brain, also possesses something that we would recognize as a mind? Are you saying that a brain without electrical impulses still possesses a mind? A person in a catatonic state still possesses a brain, yet by no reasonable argument would we say they were in possession of a mind.

A mind cannot exist without a brain. But a brain by itself is not sufficient to ensure the presence of a mind.

 

[Treedbear]

No, it most certainly does NOT imply that mind is independent from the brain. Do you seriously not understand what the term "necessary" means in that sentence?

Ahem, it's the ''but not sufficient condition'' that I am referring to and questioning.

Are you really saying that brain is both necessary and sufficient for the existence of mind? Would you then argue that an ant, because it possesses a brain, also possesses something that we would recognize as a mind? Are you saying that a brain without electrical impulses still possesses a mind? A person in a catatonic state still possesses a brain, yet by no reasonable argument would we say they were in possession of a mind.

A mind cannot exist without a brain. But a brain by itself is not sufficient to ensure the presence of a mind.

I know I'm probably alone in this opinion but my definition of mind is simply everything that a brain does. Any functional brain, even that of an ant. Conscious awareness is a separate issue and I see no reason to think a mind needs to be conscious. Although conscious awareness might be something that is only distinguishable by degree. Conscious awareness seems to be one part of the mind's processes.

Mind acording to Dictionary.com:

1. (in a human or other conscious being) the element, part, substance, or process that reasons, thinks, feels, wills, perceives, judges, etc.: the processes of the human mind.
2. Psychology. the totality of conscious and unconscious mental processes and activities.
3. intellect or understanding, as distinguished from the faculties of feeling and willing; intelligence.

 

[Speakpigeon]

Brain is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the existence of a mind.

Really? There are many examples of brain without mind but not a single example of mind without the presence and electrochemical activity of a brain.

If you have an example of mind without brain, please share.

I'd like you to take a moment and re-read my post, please.

''Brain is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the existence of a mind.'' - implies mind that is independent from brain.

No.

It means that the mind is dependent of the brain but that it is also dependent on something else. A mind requires a brain but it also requires something else.

So, I don't know which of your logic or your English is wrong but one of them is.

And then maybe both. Neither English nor logic seems necessary to write the kind of stuff you post.
EB

 

[none]

I don't see how four definitions of the word helps