You'd be correct if I were making an argument for the validity of compatibilism. I'm clearly not. I'm simply pointing out the existence of a version of free will that you persistently ignore.
Compatibalism comes up from time to time, I have never ignored it. Arguments on the subject of free will have been rumming for a long time, beginning, for me, on IIDB.
I have pointed out the incompatibility of freedom in relation to determinism many times, determinism being a condition that allows no chosen deviations from a determined course of events, which in turn negates freedom.
Basically:
''As demonstrated in earlier paragraphs there is no rational explanation for mental causation, so assuming that the “I” in question refers to a conscious agent, this statement is patently false. In other words the speaker in question here is incorrect in asserting that he, as a mental agent, did anything; a more accurate statement could read something along the lines of “my body did it”. Furthermore, the fact that this person “felt like it” was and always is completely out of his control. The thoughts and desires that cultivated this feeling were not selected by this person; they were the product of neurological activity, which was the product of some other neurological activity which was the product of some external physical stimulation and so on and so forth, all within the C.C.P.
Compatibilist reasoning acknowledges the truth of these observations, and agrees that in the aforementioned sense, free will cannot exist. The Compatibilists are eager to reconcile this fact with the belief that people are still morally responsible for their actions, and in order to do so they propose a new definition for what constitutes free will: the ability to act as desired free of constraints – if somebody willfully brings about her conduct she is morally responsible. Under this classification somebody who “did it because she felt like it” was in fact exercising her freedom of will. This definition (which I consider to be a summary of the strongest Compatibilist positions) eschews metaphysics altogether and attempts to derive a more practical connotation, one that could be put to use in legislature or in a courtroom, or even just in day-to-day moral transactions. The problem with Compatibilism is that it fails to recognize that there are two distinct conceptions (with two distinct definitions) of Free Will at play here, and thus two distinct terms are necessary to discuss them. This is the mistake that people like Hume[6], Frankfurt[7], Dennett[8] and many others make.
''Technical free will does not and cannot exist - this becomes clear with rational inspection and introspection. Practical Free Will does and must exist - this is clear from experience. By separating these terms, we may preserve the profound commandment of compassion that concluded the investigation of the former while maintaining the grounds necessary for moral responsibility in the practical world, as demanded by the latter.''
What would be more to the point would be for you to explain why you think compatibilism fails. it might at least show whether or not you understood the concept you so fervently criticise.
There are several versions of compatibalism....but basically - compatibalism; the ability to act as desired free of constraints.
1. Our universe is adequately deterministic.
2. Freedoms exist in our universe (no sane person would deny this).
Conclusion: Freedom is compatible with determinism.
Your syllogism is based on assumptions that you have not defined or not explained.
You have not explained the nature of the freedoms that are assumed in P2.
What are these freedoms when considered in relation to determinism?
Determinism means that all events unfold according prior conditions, that the future is determined completely by preceding events - a combination of prior states of the universe and the laws of nature.
What is the nature of freedom within a determined system? That is what you need to explain.
