There isn't really a 'freewill problem'.

[Speakpigeon]

Nor is not up to you to explain someone else's post. I'm sure the poster is capable of that.

What DBT means is that you don't need to explain another poster's post, because they are capable of explaining their own post.

That is what I meant, but it appears to be too complicated for some. If seems it needs explaining....

I should also need somebody else to explain to me how you got to be thinking that.

perhaps their time would be better spent roasting Frogs Legs or something....anything would be more productive.

Ah, here I have to be lost in translation. I would definitely need some native English speaker to explain to this very French homeboy what the expression "roasting Frogs Legs" could possibly mean in this context.

I could even somehow try and ask Président Macron to nominate for the Légion d'Honneur whoever explains best.
EB

 

[DBT]

That is what I meant, but it appears to be too complicated for some. If seems it needs explaining....

I should also need somebody else to explain to me how you got to be thinking that.

perhaps their time would be better spent roasting Frogs Legs or something....anything would be more productive.

Ah, here I have to be lost in translation. I would definitely need some native English speaker to explain to this very French homeboy what the expression "roasting Frogs Legs" could possibly mean in this context.

I could even somehow try and ask Président Macron to nominate for the Légion d'Honneur whoever explains best.
EB

What you as a ''French homeboy'' think, say or do is of no interest to me. That should be obvious if you consider the flippant tone of my remark, which was clearly not meant to be an accurate description of what you as a ''French homeboy'' think, say or do.

 

[untermensche]

This has become so enlightening.

There clearly is a human problem.

This is what happens when willful creatures discuss things.

And it is especially amusing when some use their will to say they do not have one.

"Yes officer I planned and carried out the murder but since I have no freedom I have no responsibility."

 

[The AntiChris]

Compatibalism comes up from time to time, I have never ignored it.

You have in that you deal with it in exactly the same way as you deal with incompatibilism. In making no distinction you effectively ignore it.

Basically:
''As demonstrated in earlier paragraphs there is no rational explanation for mental causation, so assuming that the “I” in question refers to a conscious agent, this statement is patently false. In other words the speaker in question here is incorrect in asserting that he, as a mental agent, did anything; a more accurate statement could read something along the lines of “my body did it”. Furthermore, the fact that this person “felt like it” was and always is completely out of his control. The thoughts and desires that cultivated this feeling were not selected by this person; they were the product of neurological activity, which was the product of some other neurological activity which was the product of some external physical stimulation and so on and so forth, all within the C.C.P.

Compatibilist reasoning acknowledges the truth of these observations, and agrees that in the aforementioned sense, free will cannot exist. The Compatibilists are eager to reconcile this fact with the belief that people are still morally responsible for their actions, and in order to do so they propose a new definition for what constitutes free will: the ability to act as desired free of constraints – if somebody willfully brings about her conduct she is morally responsible. Under this classification somebody who “did it because she felt like it” was in fact exercising her freedom of will. This definition (which I consider to be a summary of the strongest Compatibilist positions) eschews metaphysics altogether and attempts to derive a more practical connotation, one that could be put to use in legislature or in a courtroom, or even just in day-to-day moral transactions. The problem with Compatibilism is that it fails to recognize that there are two distinct conceptions (with two distinct definitions) of Free Will at play here, and thus two distinct terms are necessary to discuss them. This is the mistake that people like Hume[6], Frankfurt[7], Dennett[8] and many others make.

''Technical free will does not and cannot exist - this becomes clear with rational inspection and introspection. Practical Free Will does and must exist - this is clear from experience. By separating these terms, we may preserve the profound commandment of compassion that concluded the investigation of the former while maintaining the grounds necessary for moral responsibility in the practical world, as demanded by the latter.''

"Practical free" will is compatibilist free will.

The only criticism the author makes is "The problem with Compatibilism is that it fails to recognize that there are two distinct conceptions (with two distinct definitions) of Free Will at play here," (whatever this means). However, the point is that the author is not rejecting compatibilist free will on the grounds that it is incompatible with determinism (which is what you assert).

1. Our universe is adequately deterministic.

2. Freedoms exist in our universe (no sane person would deny this).

Conclusion: Freedom is compatible with determinism.

You have not explained the nature of the freedoms that are assumed in P2.

I don't need to. You didn't stipulate any specific type of "freedom" in your question to me so I'm using the word in its most general sense.

The negation of P2 is that there are no freedoms of any kind in our universe. Is this your view?

 

[Speakpigeon]

Ah, here I have to be lost in translation. I would definitely need some native English speaker to explain to this very French homeboy what the expression "roasting Frogs Legs" could possibly mean in this context.

I could even somehow try and ask Président Macron to nominate for the Légion d'Honneur whoever explains best.
EB

What you as a ''French homeboy'' think, say or do is of no interest to me. That should be obvious if you consider the flippant tone of my remark, which was clearly not meant to be an accurate description of what you as a ''French homeboy'' think, say or do.

I wasn't trying to get you to explain yourself. It just doesn't seem to work very well. A kind of infinite regress issue, I guess.

It seems I really need somebody else to explain to me how to interpret your post.
Noddy

 

[Copernicus]

DBT, I also find it hard to follow your criticism of compatibilism. There is a problem with the expression "free will", because it can be defined in several different ways. Dennett has actually addressed the various definitions in detail, yet you seem to think that he has not. If you are saying that "free will" is incompatible with determinism, then you need to explain the sense of the term that you are working with. It strikes me that you are just mired in a terminological dispute. You don't want to use the expression "free will" in a sense that is compatible with determinism, yet you still want to claim that people should be held responsible for their choices.

The whole point of "free will" is that it licenses holding people responsible for their behavior. That is why the entire philosophical conundrum is historically a theological conundrum. God is supposed to know the future, yet people still have to be free to disobey him in order to justify his retribution for disobedience. Original sin. Determinism becomes an issue, because God's perfect knowledge of the future logically determines all choices. People cannot make choices other than the ones that God knows. IOW, human reality is fully determined. So how can God hold humanity responsible for its sins (i.e. disobedience)? The philosophical debate simply removes God from the discussion while still retaining the question of whether people can be held responsible by society for their fully determined choices.

It is important to recognize that decision-making is a fully determined process, not random. However, besides making choices, humans also build mental models of how reality works. That is, they learn from experience and tinker with the autopilot that governs future choice. We cannot choose what we desire or how we resolve goal conflicts in the moment that we make choices, but we can reason about consequences and try to change future behavior on that basis. Holding people responsible for good and bad choices is part of the deterministic mechanism that governs future priorities--i.e. how we improve the resolution of goal conflicts at future decision points. The problem for society is that the mechanism does not work the same in everyone. Being held responsible does not always reinforce good behavior and inhibit bad behavior in individuals. So the law is a social process for determining how to address the failure of the reward/punishment system. Just as God needs justification for punishing and rewarding behavior, the legal system also needs justification. So how do we justify punishing lawbreakers in a deterministic universe? Compatibilism is the basis for that justification.

 

[bilby]

The human brain makes predictions about the future, and feeds those predictions back as inputs into the decision making process. The likelihood of punishment or reward is part of that process, and as a result these are justified and useful tools for controlling the behaviour of others. Freedom from determinism is not required (which is a good thing, because it seems highly unlikely that it is physically possible for it to exist).

Free will is only needed to explain people's actions and decisions if we assume the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, and benevolent deity, and are looking for a get out clause to explain why that deity doesn't prevent people from being naughty. It is the solution to a non-existent problem.

 

[DBT]

DBT, I also find it hard to follow your criticism of compatibilism.

I'd say it comes down to the nature of freedom in relation to determinism. Determinism entailing that any progression of events within a determined system are fixed as a matter of natural law and causality, hence allowing no deviation from the determined course of events.

So, what is freedom and how does freedom relate to a determined system where everything that happens is fixed as a matter of natural law and causality?

If compatibalism claims that free will is compatible with determinism because we are able to act upon will without apparent coercion it is wrong.

It is wrong because deterministic causality has formed the persons desire to do X, therefore the desire to do X is not freely chosen and the actions that follow are determined by the desire and are a consequence of it.

Nothing is freely willed. All actions based on will are determined by what is willed along with the capacity to act, motor actions initiated by brain state forming will and acting upon it.

Compatibalists either indulge in word play, assigning words to things where they don't apply or want it both ways, both freedom and determinism by redefining both in order to accommodate the desired outcome.

Cold comfort in compatibalism;
''How is this supposed to work? First, we have to accept the view that prior events have caused the person’s current desire to do X. Wanting to do X is fully determined by these prior causes (and perhaps a dash of true chance). Now that the desire to do X is being felt, there are no other constraints that keep the person from doing what he wants, namely X. At this point, we should ascribe free will to all animals capable of experiencing desires (e.g., to eat, sleep, or mate). Yet, we don’t; and we tend not to judge non-human animals in moral terms. Exceptions occur, but are swiftly dismissed as errors of anthropomorphism.'
''Some aspiring compatibilists maintain that only humans are judged morally because only they could have acted differently. Those who try this argument must realize that they are not compatibilists at all; they are libertarians. The acceptance of determinism is a defining element of compatibilism. It forbids us to say that evil-doers could have done good if only they wanted to. Well yes, if they wanted to, but they were determined to not want to.

Hence, the compatibilist must find a defense for moral judgment that is applicable only to humans and that is safely nonlibertarian. He must look for a psychological feature that is presumably uniquely human and that is involved in the causal chain leading to action. The general version of this feature is self-consciousness and the specific version is intentionality. In other words, a person is judged to have acted freely and (ir)responsibly if he was aware of his desire to do X, foresaw the consequences (e.g., how moralists would judge him if he did X), and endorsed the desire (thereby forming an intention). Notice that a true compatibilist, who has gone on record saying that determinism is a fact of nature, must believe that the events of experiencing a desire, foreseeing the consequences of action, and forming an intention to act on the desire, are all determined. The causal chain leading a human to lift a finger is longer than the chain leading a squirrel to lift an acorn, but it is no less deterministic (he who says that it is less deterministic is not a compatibilist but a closet libertarian).''

There is a problem with the expression "free will", because it can be defined in several different ways.

There lies the problem of semantics. Should words not relate to something? Ideas, objects, events, etc? If we are talking about determinism? What is freedom? How does freedom relate to determinism? Is claiming that the ability to act upon desires an example of freedom within a determined system? Given the terms and conditions, that will is determined within a deterministic system and that action that follow are a matter of consequence of prior state of will, is this sufficient to claim freedom of will?

I would be inclined to say not sufficient.

- - - Updated - - -

Ah, here I have to be lost in translation. I would definitely need some native English speaker to explain to this very French homeboy what the expression "roasting Frogs Legs" could possibly mean in this context.

I could even somehow try and ask Président Macron to nominate for the Légion d'Honneur whoever explains best.
EB

What you as a ''French homeboy'' think, say or do is of no interest to me. That should be obvious if you consider the flippant tone of my remark, which was clearly not meant to be an accurate description of what you as a ''French homeboy'' think, say or do.

I wasn't trying to get you to explain yourself. It just doesn't seem to work very well. A kind of infinite regress issue, I guess.

It seems I really need somebody else to explain to me how to interpret your post.
Noddy

Yawn. what a clever boy you are.

 

[untermensche]

What is freedom?

The only thing that could possibly act freely within the human is the mind. The mind acts mainly as a decision maker. It is constantly making decisions.

And for a mind to act freely means for the mind to make decisions based on ideas and not based on some deterministic mechanism of the brain.

Those are two very different situations and claims that they are the same thing are absurd.

Why do you have the ideas you try to express?

Did you decide to have them?

Do you base them on something?

Basing ideas on published papers is still a free decision based on ideas not some brain reflex.

 

[Speakpigeon]

There are no examples of mind without the existence and activity of a brain. If you can explain mind without brain agency, go ahead, do your best.

Sure, but there are PLENTY of examples of a brain without a mind.

Brain is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the existence of a mind.

Think about an analogy: There is no person without a body. Yup, that's true. But that doesn't make a body alone into a person. A body is a physical construct. A person is a set of experiences, patterns, and processes that act upon a body.

Really? There are many examples of brain without mind but not a single example of mind without the presence and electrochemical activity of a brain.

If you have an example of mind without brain, please share.

I'd like you to take a moment and re-read my post, please.

''Brain is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the existence of a mind.'' - implies mind that is independent from brain.

No.

It means that the mind is dependent of the brain but that it is also dependent on something else. A mind requires a brain but it also requires something else.

So, I don't know which of your logic or your English is wrong but one of them is.

And then maybe both. Neither English nor logic seems necessary to write the kind of stuff you post.
EB

This Noddy the Frog Clever Boy was asking you what Emily Lake's rather straightforward sentence meant.

So, here's another chance to redeem yourself. Just look at it again :

Brain is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the existence of a mind.

Does it really imply, as you insisted, that the mind would be independent from the brain to say that a brain is necessary for the existence of a mind?

I'm just baffled.
Noddy

 

[Emily Lake]

Treedbear was only talking about a "functional brain". And if the brain is already decomposing, then it's no longer a functional brain.

Still, why not. Clearly, being alive, if I'm really that, I wouldn't know, but I would still expect that a freshly dead corpse might well still have a mind, although I suspect death would have to be very fresh for that to happen.
EB

Well I guess it depends what is meant by 'functional' in this context. If it merely means 'has a mind', then the argument is circular.

I'm not particular where the line gets drawn, but if a brain is sufficiently altered it becomes non-functional as a brain. The same goes for any organ. Just as altering a boat or a chair to the point that it no longer serves the purpose. The brain's purpose is to organize the body's other functions to adapt to its environment.

Okaaaayyyy... but it's perfectly possible to alter a brain to a point where it still functions as a brain but no longer allows for a mind.

 

[Emily Lake]

You are redefining possibility and probability as statements of fact about a future event, and then inferring that this is how determinists view past events as having 100% probability, when the applicable word would be certainty. They actually mean different things. When you do that probability loses it's meaning. And it's not because statistical analysis would be inaccurate or inapplicable if determinism is true. You are simply misinterpreting the meaning of the words.

Umm... no. I'm taking this from the mathematical perspective and defining them accurately.

A deterministic framework is one in which any set of causes produces one and only one effect. For example... 2 + 3 = 5. It always equals 5, it cannot equal anything else. It's possible for more than one set of causes to produce the same effect, but at no point can one set of causes produce more than one effect. For example, (-2)^2 = (2)^2 = 4. Two different causes (-2 and 2) produce the same effect (4), but never will a single cause produce multiple effects.

A stochastic framework is one in which any set of causes can produce more than one effect. This is the realm of statistics. The exact same set of inputs produces a set of possible outputs.

We know that the very very small in our world is NOT deterministic. At quantum levels, you have uncertainty and discontinuities, both of which produce sets of possible effects for the same cause.
We know that the very very large in our world is NOT deterministic. At large scales, you have complexity and singularities, both of which produce sets of possible effects for the same cause.

And yet several people in this thread argue that our scale of the world is special, and has no uncertainty, no discontinuities, no complexity, and no singularities. They argue that our scale is immune to those multi-effect causes, and that our scale is ONLY deterministic and is NOT stochastic. They go so far as to argue that something being indeterminate is identical to something being magically 'uncaused'.

Which is simply baloney. As well as special pleading.

 

[Emily Lake]

I'd like you to take a moment and re-read my post, please.

''Brain is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the existence of a mind.'' - implies mind that is independent from brain.

No.

It means that the mind is dependent of the brain but that it is also dependent on something else. A mind requires a brain but it also requires something else.

So, I don't know which of your logic or your English is wrong but one of them is.

And then maybe both. Neither English nor logic seems necessary to write the kind of stuff you post.
EB

Hey Noddy, the comment I responded to is open to more interpretation than your arrogant mind may like to believe. Nor is not up to you to explain someone else's post. I'm sure the poster is capable of that.

Well, clearly someone else needed to interpret it for you since the core concept of "necessary but not sufficient" seems to have been seriously missed. Even though I gave an explanatory example that clearly contradicts the interpretation you came away with.

Then of course, you proceeded to ignore my clarifications on the topic and run with your strawman... So yeah, I'm okay with someone else interpreting my post for you - maybe someone else will be more successful at conveying high-school mathematical concepts than I have been.

 

[Copernicus]

You are redefining possibility and probability as statements of fact about a future event, and then inferring that this is how determinists view past events as having 100% probability, when the applicable word would be certainty. They actually mean different things. When you do that probability loses it's meaning. And it's not because statistical analysis would be inaccurate or inapplicable if determinism is true. You are simply misinterpreting the meaning of the words.

Umm... no. I'm taking this from the mathematical perspective and defining them accurately.

A deterministic framework is one in which any set of causes produces one and only one effect. For example... 2 + 3 = 5. It always equals 5, it cannot equal anything else. It's possible for more than one set of causes to produce the same effect, but at no point can one set of causes produce more than one effect. For example, (-2)^2 = (2)^2 = 4. Two different causes (-2 and 2) produce the same effect (4), but never will a single cause produce multiple effects.

A stochastic framework is one in which any set of causes can produce more than one effect. This is the realm of statistics. The exact same set of inputs produces a set of possible outputs.

We know that the very very small in our world is NOT deterministic. At quantum levels, you have uncertainty and discontinuities, both of which produce sets of possible effects for the same cause.
We know that the very very large in our world is NOT deterministic. At large scales, you have complexity and singularities, both of which produce sets of possible effects for the same cause.

And yet several people in this thread argue that our scale of the world is special, and has no uncertainty, no discontinuities, no complexity, and no singularities. They argue that our scale is immune to those multi-effect causes, and that our scale is ONLY deterministic and is NOT stochastic. They go so far as to argue that something being indeterminate is identical to something being magically 'uncaused'.

Which is simply baloney. As well as special pleading.

You still have not come up with any attempt to explain what quantum indeterminacy has to do with free will. What role does it play? If even a small part of the decision-making process is inherently random, how does that explain the phenomenon of being free to make a choice?

 

[Emily Lake]

You are redefining possibility and probability as statements of fact about a future event, and then inferring that this is how determinists view past events as having 100% probability, when the applicable word would be certainty. They actually mean different things. When you do that probability loses it's meaning. And it's not because statistical analysis would be inaccurate or inapplicable if determinism is true. You are simply misinterpreting the meaning of the words.

Umm... no. I'm taking this from the mathematical perspective and defining them accurately.

A deterministic framework is one in which any set of causes produces one and only one effect. For example... 2 + 3 = 5. It always equals 5, it cannot equal anything else. It's possible for more than one set of causes to produce the same effect, but at no point can one set of causes produce more than one effect. For example, (-2)^2 = (2)^2 = 4. Two different causes (-2 and 2) produce the same effect (4), but never will a single cause produce multiple effects.

A stochastic framework is one in which any set of causes can produce more than one effect. This is the realm of statistics. The exact same set of inputs produces a set of possible outputs.

We know that the very very small in our world is NOT deterministic. At quantum levels, you have uncertainty and discontinuities, both of which produce sets of possible effects for the same cause.
We know that the very very large in our world is NOT deterministic. At large scales, you have complexity and singularities, both of which produce sets of possible effects for the same cause.

And yet several people in this thread argue that our scale of the world is special, and has no uncertainty, no discontinuities, no complexity, and no singularities. They argue that our scale is immune to those multi-effect causes, and that our scale is ONLY deterministic and is NOT stochastic. They go so far as to argue that something being indeterminate is identical to something being magically 'uncaused'.

Which is simply baloney. As well as special pleading.

You still have not come up with any attempt to explain what quantum indeterminacy has to do with free will. What role does it play? If even a small part of the decision-making process is inherently random, how does that explain the phenomenon of being free to make a choice?

I'm not claiming that randomness creates free will. But it DOES invalidate determinism.

 

[Treedbear]

I'm not particular where the line gets drawn, but if a brain is sufficiently altered it becomes non-functional as a brain. The same goes for any organ. Just as altering a boat or a chair to the point that it no longer serves the purpose. The brain's purpose is to organize the body's other functions to adapt to its environment.

Okaaaayyyy... but it's perfectly possible to alter a brain to a point where it still functions as a brain but no longer allows for a mind.

I disagree. I define mind as what a functioning brain does. A disfunctional brain is no longer capable of doing the things required in order that the organism itself can adapt to and function effectively in its environment. I admit most people try to elevate the mind to some higher level. Aside from the need to explain conscious awareness (the "hard problem") I think the brain is a necessary but not and sufficient condition for the existence of a mind. So I need to ask, how do you define the mind, and what does it mean when "a brain no longer allows for a mind"?

 

[Emily Lake]

I'm not particular where the line gets drawn, but if a brain is sufficiently altered it becomes non-functional as a brain. The same goes for any organ. Just as altering a boat or a chair to the point that it no longer serves the purpose. The brain's purpose is to organize the body's other functions to adapt to its environment.

Okaaaayyyy... but it's perfectly possible to alter a brain to a point where it still functions as a brain but no longer allows for a mind.

I disagree. I define mind as what a functioning brain does. A disfunctional brain is no longer capable of doing the things required in order that the organism itself can adapt to and function effectively in its environment. I admit most people try to elevate the mind to some higher level. Aside from the need to explain conscious awareness (the "hard problem") I think the brain is a necessary but not and sufficient condition for the existence of a mind. So I need to ask, how do you define the mind, and what does it mean when "a brain no longer allows for a mind"?

A person in a persistent vegetative state has a brain that continues to keep their body functioning... but I wouldn't say they have a mind. I think a mind requires a consciousness. With that as a basis for the definition of 'mind', I might argue that jellyfish have brains, but have nothing that anyone would consider a mind. Most insects have brains without minds. Hell, one might argue that crocodiles, great killing machines that they are, have brains but not minds.

A brain performs many functions. A consciousness capable of thinking and reasoning is only one of those many functions, and there are many, many, many examples on this planet of brains that do not have the capacity for reason, or thought, or in some cases even self-awareness.

And without that capacity... I don't know what it is that you would consider a mind to be.

 

[bilby]

I disagree. I define mind as what a functioning brain does. A disfunctional brain is no longer capable of doing the things required in order that the organism itself can adapt to and function effectively in its environment. I admit most people try to elevate the mind to some higher level. Aside from the need to explain conscious awareness (the "hard problem") I think the brain is a necessary but not and sufficient condition for the existence of a mind. So I need to ask, how do you define the mind, and what does it mean when "a brain no longer allows for a mind"?

A person in a persistent vegetative state has a brain that continues to keep their body functioning... but I wouldn't say they have a mind. I think a mind requires a consciousness. With that as a basis for the definition of 'mind', I might argue that jellyfish have brains, but have nothing that anyone would consider a mind. Most insects have brains without minds. Hell, one might argue that crocodiles, great killing machines that they are, have brains but not minds.

A brain performs many functions. A consciousness capable of thinking and reasoning is only one of those many functions, and there are many, many, many examples on this planet of brains that do not have the capacity for reason, or thought, or in some cases even self-awareness.

And without that capacity... I don't know what it is that you would consider a mind to be.

One might argue that Negroes have brains but not minds, and indeed that argument has been made, to dreadful effect.

The fact remains that we cannot know whether other humans, much less crocodiles or insects are self aware; All we can do is guess, and use our estimation of how similar they are to us as a crude guide to how likely it is that they are self aware. It seems to me unlikely, but certainly not impossible, that all functioning brains imply self awareness. Indeed, any complex system might conceivably be self aware - How could we possibly detect this if it exists, or demonstrate its absence if it does not? If a crocodile, or a tree, or an insect, or a computer, or even a rock was self aware, how could we ever know?

There are at least a few examples on this discussion board of brains that do not demonstrate a convincing capacity for reason. We assume that they do have the capacity for thought, and for self-awareness. But that's just presumption, and is offered only because they are superficially very similar to ourselves.

 

[DBT]

I don't need to. You didn't stipulate any specific type of "freedom" in your question to me so I'm using the word in its most general sense.

The negation of P2 is that there are no freedoms of any kind in our universe. Is this your view?

Without references to how the world actually is and how the world works, you have nothing but a word salad, a semantic construct....no better than; god is love, love exists, hence God exists....

 

[DBT]

So, here's another chance to redeem yourself. Just look at it again :

Brain is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the existence of a mind.

Does it really imply, as you insisted, that the mind would be independent from the brain to say that a brain is necessary for the existence of a mind?

I'm just baffled.
Noddy

You are baffled regardless of what anyone says....I have already said that my contention lies in the remark 'but not sufficient condition for the existence of a mind'' - so what does ''not sufficient'' mean?

As written, a 'not sufficient condition' implies something more. But what more than a brain is necessary to explain mind/consciousness?


I don't insist that this is what Emily meant, but as written, not sufficient condition, implies that something more than a brain may be needed to explain the existence mind.

What could that be?

If the brain is said to be a not sufficient condition to explain the existence of mind/consciousness, then what? What are the options?