My New Argument for a Nonphysical Consciousness

[bilby]

It doesn't matter what anyone 'likes'. It is not logically possible that one's sense identity is due to continuity of consciousness, because we observe that our own consciousness is discontinuous; and that nonetheless our sense of identity remains.

That's why I said I now have two arguments. And you seem to be acknowledging them both indirectly.

A because it doesn't 't show up in your physical account when comparing it to something with continuity

I cannot parse this. There are too many 'its', and 'somethings'; could you please re-phrase with some nouns for me?

You mean proper nouns instead of pronouns [... with a smug smile].

Okay, "it" = the non-physical entity, and something is not suppose to be a pronoun for anything.

B. Furthermore, there is also an objective truth that the mind in Sydney has different identity that the mind in Perth.

Of course it fucking does. It is a physically different object! If you have two identical copies, you have two objects; so you have two sets of attributes.

How are they physically different?

There are two of them. One is a different number from two.

They do not share a single consciousness, any more than they share a single left hand; no matter how similar the two copies might be, there are two of everything.

 

[Kharakov]

What exactly is non-physical and how did you demonstrate that this non-physical substance exists?

Are you defining physical data as separate from the mind? Is physical data something along the lines of numbers that the mind doesn't feel, or matter which contains information that the mind does not feel, etc.?

That's not what I am arguing about. To sum it up, your identity is different than a perfect clone of you. Yet you are physically the same.

Ok, how is my mind not a physical entity? Are you saying that mind is something in addition to physical reality, which is venient upon PR and PR is venient upon it?

 

[ryan]

How are they physically different?

There are two of them. One is a different number from two.

I agree. But we are not comparing one of them to both of them.

They do not share a single consciousness, any more than they share a single left hand; no matter how similar the two copies might be, there are two of everything.

Who is saying that they share a single consciousness?

 

[ryan]

That's not what I am arguing about. To sum it up, your identity is different than a perfect clone of you. Yet you are physically the same.

Ok, how is my mind not a physical entity? Are you saying that mind is something in addition to physical reality, which is venient upon PR and PR is venient upon it?

I just explained it.

You are in Sydney, but your clone is in Perth.

 

[bilby]

There are two of them. One is a different number from two.

I agree. But we are not comparing one of them to both of them.

They do not share a single consciousness, any more than they share a single left hand; no matter how similar the two copies might be, there are two of everything.

Who is saying that they share a single consciousness?

I understood your argument to be that they SHOULD share a single consciousness if consciousness was physical; and that as they DO NOT, consciousness is non-physical.

I call bullshit on the premise - no matter how similar two brains are, if they are separate, they will each have their own consciousness - and that is true whether or not consciousness is physical, so your thought experiment is silent on the matter you are seeking to discuss.

If that is not your position, what is?

 

[ryan]

I agree. But we are not comparing one of them to both of them.

They do not share a single consciousness, any more than they share a single left hand; no matter how similar the two copies might be, there are two of everything.

Who is saying that they share a single consciousness?

I understood your argument to be that they SHOULD share a single consciousness if consciousness was physical; and that as they DO NOT, consciousness is non-physical.

I call bullshit on the premise - no matter how similar two brains are, if they are separate, they will each have their own consciousness - and that is true whether or not consciousness is physical, so your thought experiment is silent on the matter you are seeking to discuss.

If that is not your position, what is?

I have never said anything about a singular consciousness. It would be like saying that they should share electrons. By the way, that does seem to be the only argument against me that is left.

Anyways, here is my argument - again.

You are in Sydney, and your clone is in Perth. You exist in Sydney, but you do not exist in Perth.

 

[bilby]

I agree. But we are not comparing one of them to both of them.

They do not share a single consciousness, any more than they share a single left hand; no matter how similar the two copies might be, there are two of everything.

Who is saying that they share a single consciousness?

I understood your argument to be that they SHOULD share a single consciousness if consciousness was physical; and that as they DO NOT, consciousness is non-physical.

I call bullshit on the premise - no matter how similar two brains are, if they are separate, they will each have their own consciousness - and that is true whether or not consciousness is physical, so your thought experiment is silent on the matter you are seeking to discuss.

If that is not your position, what is?

I have never said anything about a singular consciousness. It would be like saying that they should share electrons. By the way, that does seem to be the only argument against me that is left.

Anyways, here is my argument - again.

You are in Sydney, and your clone is in Perth. You exist in Sydney, but you do not exist in Perth.

Ok, let me break this down here - adding one (I hope non-controversial) premise:

P0) Individuals exist only in one location in space-time
P1) You are in Sydney
P2) You have a 'clone' who is exactly identical to you in every way
P3) This 'clone' has been constructed in Perth
C1) You exist in Sydney (from P1)
C2) You do not exist in Perth (from P0 and C1)
C3) Consciousness is nonphysical (from straight out of fucking nowhere).

C3 seems to be a non-sequitur. How the hell do the premises support, or even bear a shred of relationship to, this conclusion?

 

[Kharakov]

Ok, how is my mind not a physical entity? Are you saying that mind is something in addition to physical reality, which is venient upon PR and PR is venient upon it?

I just explained it.

You are in Sydney, but your clone is in Perth.

Sure. 2 exact physical copies, that are in some sort of isolation chamber in which they are exposed to the exact same circumstances, so evolve the same.

I still don't see the nonphysical side, which is why I asked "Are you saying that mind is something in addition to physical reality, which is venient upon PR and PR is venient upon it?"

How is either copy nonphysical?

 

[ryan]

I understood your argument to be that they SHOULD share a single consciousness if consciousness was physical; and that as they DO NOT, consciousness is non-physical.

I call bullshit on the premise - no matter how similar two brains are, if they are separate, they will each have their own consciousness - and that is true whether or not consciousness is physical, so your thought experiment is silent on the matter you are seeking to discuss.

If that is not your position, what is?

I have never said anything about a singular consciousness. It would be like saying that they should share electrons. By the way, that does seem to be the only argument against me that is left.

Anyways, here is my argument - again.

You are in Sydney, and your clone is in Perth. You exist in Sydney, but you do not exist in Perth.

Ok, let me break this down here - adding one (I hope non-controversial) premise:

P0) Individuals exist only in one location in space-time
P1) You are in Sydney
P2) You have a 'clone' who is exactly identical to you in every way
P3) This 'clone' has been constructed in Perth
C1) You exist in Sydney (from P1)
C2) You do not exist in Perth (from P0 and C1)
C3) Consciousness is nonphysical (from straight out of fucking nowhere).

C3 seems to be a non-sequitur. How the hell do the premises support, or even bear a shred of relationship to, this conclusion?

The "you" in C2 is the non-physical difference. Notice that there is something in Sydney that is not in Perth, namely "you".

 

[ryan]

I just explained it.

You are in Sydney, but your clone is in Perth.

Sure. 2 exact physical copies, that are in some sort of isolation chamber in which they are exposed to the exact same circumstances, so evolve the same.

Sydney has something in your body that Perth doesn't have. This something is your consciousness. Even though there is an identical consciousness in Perth. You are in Sydney.

I still don't see the nonphysical side, which is why I asked "Are you saying that mind is something in addition to physical reality, which is venient upon PR and PR is venient upon it?"

Forget this.

 

[bilby]

I understood your argument to be that they SHOULD share a single consciousness if consciousness was physical; and that as they DO NOT, consciousness is non-physical.

I call bullshit on the premise - no matter how similar two brains are, if they are separate, they will each have their own consciousness - and that is true whether or not consciousness is physical, so your thought experiment is silent on the matter you are seeking to discuss.

If that is not your position, what is?

I have never said anything about a singular consciousness. It would be like saying that they should share electrons. By the way, that does seem to be the only argument against me that is left.

Anyways, here is my argument - again.

You are in Sydney, and your clone is in Perth. You exist in Sydney, but you do not exist in Perth.

Ok, let me break this down here - adding one (I hope non-controversial) premise:

P0) Individuals exist only in one location in space-time
P1) You are in Sydney
P2) You have a 'clone' who is exactly identical to you in every way
P3) This 'clone' has been constructed in Perth
C1) You exist in Sydney (from P1)
C2) You do not exist in Perth (from P0 and C1)
C3) Consciousness is nonphysical (from straight out of fucking nowhere).

C3 seems to be a non-sequitur. How the hell do the premises support, or even bear a shred of relationship to, this conclusion?

The "you" in C2 is the non-physical difference. Notice that there is something in Sydney that is not in Perth, namely "you".

'You' is just a place-holder. As the great philosopher Julie Andrews once defined it: "Me, a name I call myself"; 'You' is a name I call someone else. (As an aside, 'Doe' is a deer. A female deer).

Let's remove that confusion by using some proper names:

P0) Individuals exist only in one location in space-time
P1) Individual 'A' is in Sydney
P2) Individual 'A' has a 'clone', Individual 'B' who is exactly identical to Individual 'A' in every way
P3) Individual 'B' has been constructed in Perth
C1) Individual 'A' exists in Sydney (from P1)
C2) Individual 'A' does not exist in Perth (from P0 and C1)
C3) Consciousness is nonphysical (from straight out of fucking nowhere).

C3 still seems to be a non-sequitur. How the hell do the premises support, or even bear a shred of relationship to, this conclusion?

 

[DBT]

Most probably because it doesn't support certain cherished beliefs about the ultimate nature of consciousness...

You obviously have not read my post (post #383) in the other thread.

I thought that you were arguing for the reality of non physical consciousness? That is the title of the thread.

 

[bigfield]

You claimed that the original brain gets the identity that existed previously, while the clone does not:

The reality is that you are not experiencing in Perth.

The simplest explanation for that claim is that you think that the mind supervenes the brain, and therefore there is no reason to postulate a supernatural essence/soul that exists independently of the brain.

But one supervenient mind has a true identity, and nobody can know this with a physical assessment.

Both have an identity, but only one is running on the brain that was not cloned. That is a physical difference.

That it takes omniscience to know that physical difference in your hyptothetical scenario does not mean that the physical difference does not exist.

 

[bigfield]

I understood your argument to be that they SHOULD share a single consciousness if consciousness was physical; and that as they DO NOT, consciousness is non-physical.

I call bullshit on the premise - no matter how similar two brains are, if they are separate, they will each have their own consciousness - and that is true whether or not consciousness is physical, so your thought experiment is silent on the matter you are seeking to discuss.

If that is not your position, what is?

I have never said anything about a singular consciousness. It would be like saying that they should share electrons. By the way, that does seem to be the only argument against me that is left.

Anyways, here is my argument - again.

You are in Sydney, and your clone is in Perth. You exist in Sydney, but you do not exist in Perth.

Ok, let me break this down here - adding one (I hope non-controversial) premise:

P0) Individuals exist only in one location in space-time
P1) You are in Sydney
P2) You have a 'clone' who is exactly identical to you in every way
P3) This 'clone' has been constructed in Perth
C1) You exist in Sydney (from P1)
C2) You do not exist in Perth (from P0 and C1)
C3) Consciousness is nonphysical (from straight out of fucking nowhere).

C3 seems to be a non-sequitur. How the hell do the premises support, or even bear a shred of relationship to, this conclusion?

The "you" in C2 is the non-physical difference. Notice that there is something in Sydney that is not in Perth, namely "you".

'You' is just a place-holder. As the great philosopher Julie Andrews once defined it: "Me, a name I call myself"; 'You' is a name I call someone else. (As an aside, 'Doe' is a deer. A female deer).

Let's remove that confusion by using some proper names:

P0) Individuals exist only in one location in space-time
P1) Individual 'A' is in Sydney
P2) Individual 'A' has a 'clone', Individual 'B' who is exactly identical to Individual 'A' in every way
P3) Individual 'B' has been constructed in Perth
C1) Individual 'A' exists in Sydney (from P1)
C2) Individual 'A' does not exist in Perth (from P0 and C1)
C3) Consciousness is nonphysical (from straight out of fucking nowhere).

C3 still seems to be a non-sequitur. How the hell do the premises support, or even bear a shred of relationship to, this conclusion?

Ryan is claiming that there is no physical difference between the two Individuals, but that their personal identities are different, therefore the identities supervene on some non-physical property. In other words, he is postulating the existence of a soul.

The argument fails because his premise that there is no physical difference is false.

 

[bilby]

Ryan is claiming that there is no physical difference between the two Individuals, but that their personal identities are different, therefore the identities supervene on some non-physical property. In other words, he is postulating the existence of a soul.

The argument fails because his premise that there is no physical difference is false.

Ahhhh. Souls.


(For more information, please read my post out loud).

 

[ryan]

Ok, let me break this down here - adding one (I hope non-controversial) premise:

P0) Individuals exist only in one location in space-time
P1) You are in Sydney
P2) You have a 'clone' who is exactly identical to you in every way
P3) This 'clone' has been constructed in Perth
C1) You exist in Sydney (from P1)
C2) You do not exist in Perth (from P0 and C1)
C3) Consciousness is nonphysical (from straight out of fucking nowhere).

C3 seems to be a non-sequitur. How the hell do the premises support, or even bear a shred of relationship to, this conclusion?

The "you" in C2 is the non-physical difference. Notice that there is something in Sydney that is not in Perth, namely "you".

'You' is just a place-holder. As the great philosopher Julie Andrews once defined it: "Me, a name I call myself"; 'You' is a name I call someone else. (As an aside, 'Doe' is a deer. A female deer).

Let's remove that confusion by using some proper names:

P0) Individuals exist only in one location in space-time
P1) Individual 'A' is in Sydney
P2) Individual 'A' has a 'clone', Individual 'B' who is exactly identical to Individual 'A' in every way
P3) Individual 'B' has been constructed in Perth
C1) Individual 'A' exists in Sydney (from P1)
C2) Individual 'A' does not exist in Perth (from P0 and C1)
C3) Consciousness is nonphysical (from straight out of fucking nowhere).

C3 still seems to be a non-sequitur. How the hell do the premises support, or even bear a shred of relationship to, this conclusion?

Changing "you" to '"A"' is not a very persuasive rebuttal.

 

[ryan]

You obviously have not read my post (post #383) in the other thread.

I thought that you were arguing for the reality of non physical consciousness? That is the title of the thread.

What made you ask this? As far as I know, I am still arguing for a non-physical consciousness.

 

[ryan]

You claimed that the original brain gets the identity that existed previously, while the clone does not:

The reality is that you are not experiencing in Perth.

The simplest explanation for that claim is that you think that the mind supervenes the brain, and therefore there is no reason to postulate a supernatural essence/soul that exists independently of the brain.

But one supervenient mind has a true identity, and nobody can know this with a physical assessment.

Both have an identity, but only one is running on the brain that was not cloned. That is a physical difference.

That it takes omniscience to know that physical difference in your hyptothetical scenario does not mean that the physical difference does not exist.

I agree that there was a physical difference, but there isn't a physical difference anymore.

 

[bigfield]

You claimed that the original brain gets the identity that existed previously, while the clone does not:

The reality is that you are not experiencing in Perth.

The simplest explanation for that claim is that you think that the mind supervenes the brain, and therefore there is no reason to postulate a supernatural essence/soul that exists independently of the brain.

But one supervenient mind has a true identity, and nobody can know this with a physical assessment.

Both have an identity, but only one is running on the brain that was not cloned. That is a physical difference.

That it takes omniscience to know that physical difference in your hyptothetical scenario does not mean that the physical difference does not exist.

I agree that there was a physical difference, but there isn't a physical difference anymore.

Could you clarify: when was there a physical difference between the original and the clone, and when does this difference cease to exist?

 

[bilby]

Ok, let me break this down here - adding one (I hope non-controversial) premise:

P0) Individuals exist only in one location in space-time
P1) You are in Sydney
P2) You have a 'clone' who is exactly identical to you in every way
P3) This 'clone' has been constructed in Perth
C1) You exist in Sydney (from P1)
C2) You do not exist in Perth (from P0 and C1)
C3) Consciousness is nonphysical (from straight out of fucking nowhere).

C3 seems to be a non-sequitur. How the hell do the premises support, or even bear a shred of relationship to, this conclusion?

The "you" in C2 is the non-physical difference. Notice that there is something in Sydney that is not in Perth, namely "you".

'You' is just a place-holder. As the great philosopher Julie Andrews once defined it: "Me, a name I call myself"; 'You' is a name I call someone else. (As an aside, 'Doe' is a deer. A female deer).

Let's remove that confusion by using some proper names:

P0) Individuals exist only in one location in space-time
P1) Individual 'A' is in Sydney
P2) Individual 'A' has a 'clone', Individual 'B' who is exactly identical to Individual 'A' in every way
P3) Individual 'B' has been constructed in Perth
C1) Individual 'A' exists in Sydney (from P1)
C2) Individual 'A' does not exist in Perth (from P0 and C1)
C3) Consciousness is nonphysical (from straight out of fucking nowhere).

C3 still seems to be a non-sequitur. How the hell do the premises support, or even bear a shred of relationship to, this conclusion?

Changing "you" to '"A"' is not a very persuasive rebuttal.

Changing "you" to "'A'" isn't intended to be a rebuttal; it is intended to be a clarification.

The entirety of the rebuttal still stands - You are engaged in a massive non-sequitur.

If the 'you' in my original C2 is a non-physical difference, then presumably you seek to claim that the 'Individual A' in the revised C2 is a non-physical difference.

Would you like to explain what it is about 'Individual A' that you are claiming is non-physical please?

And while you are at it, I would be grateful if you could also explain what it is about 'Individual A' that is a difference.

Thanks!